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be within his “legal” rights to do so. Since 1870, the United
States Constitution, the highest law of the land, had provided
that “[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged . . . by any State on account of race.”1
Two federal statutes protected this right.2 But the reality is
that the state and private individuals would vigorously attempt
to stop him from voting, even to the point of subjecting him and
his family to violence. People that attempted to help him vote
could be beaten and even murdered.3
The point of this simple but sad hypothetical is that civil
rights laws do not magically create change. Even the most farreaching and thoughtfully drafted statutes need to be enforced
to have any real impact. In the above example, it was not until
the passage and enforcement of the Voting Rights Act of 19654
that overt forms of racial exclusion in voting became, for the
most part, confined to the history books.
Our collective antidiscrimination experiences have taught
us that there can be a significant gap between law and reality.
The spectrum and depth of federal civil rights statutes, including the Voting Rights Act of 1965,5 Titles II and VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,6 the Fair Housing Act,7 and, most recently,
the Americans with Disabilities Act,8 are impressive and a
source of national pride. But these statutes have not created a
more inclusive society on their own. Behind every individual
gain stands the efforts of social forces dedicated to their enforcement.
The process of enforcement therefore needs to be studied
and analyzed as part of the larger debate over the form and di1. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
2. See Civil Rights Act of 1957, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975 (1964); see also
Civil Rights Act of 1960, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971(c)–(e), 1974e, 1975 (1964).
3. State-sanctioned practices to deny African Americans the right to vote
included poll taxes, literacy requirements, and, in Mississippi, a discriminatorily applied constitutional requirement that voters be able to read any section
of the Mississippi Constitution and give a reasonable interpretation thereof.
See ROY BROOKS ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 559 (2005); see also
DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 482–86 (2004). The violence of this era is well chronicled. Id. at 491.
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973–1973p (1970).
5. Id.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a–3a (2000) (nondiscrimination in places of public accommodation); id. § 2000e–2000e-17 (nondiscrimination in employment).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604–3606, 3617 (1988).
8. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104
Stat. 327 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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rection of civil rights laws. Of late, this discussion has increasingly turned toward the judicially and legislatively imposed
limitations on private enforcement.9 To be sure, there is an important story to be told about how the ability of private lawyers
to bring civil rights cases in the public interest (functioning as
a “private attorney general”) has been systematically undermined. But what is being increasingly left out of the public and
academic discussion is the role of the federal government as an
enforcer of civil rights laws (what I will call “public enforcement”). Despite being almost entirely a function of presidential
prerogative, public enforcement of civil rights laws is not often
discussed in presidential races. And existing academic accounts
tend to treat public enforcement as chronically ineffective and
incapable of improvement.10 In the current political environment, it may seem naïve or overly ambitious to talk about a
more systemic and effective role for public enforcement authorities. But administrations do not last forever, and when the
pendulum swings back in a more pro–civil rights direction, it is
important to have models of more proactive public enforcement
behavior. Moreover, as will be discussed herein, history suggests that a casual dismissal of the effectiveness of public enforcement is not entirely warranted.
My goal is to enlarge the civil rights dialogue by renewing
emphasis on the importance and form of public enforcement.
The current decline of the private attorney general’s ability to
fairly and consistently enforce our civil rights laws strengthens
the argument for a renewed emphasis on the various enforcement apparatuses of the federal government. When the United
States takes a strong stand to protect the civil rights of its citizens, it sends a symbolic message and expresses the will of the
people in a way that cannot and should not be completely outsourced.
Focusing on the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),11
this Article first makes the case that a stronger government
role is needed, then explores what that role can and should look
like. Within the context of the ADA, I will argue that the executive branch’s role should vary depending on the context. In the
areas of failure-to-hire claims and those involving physical accessibility, public enforcement officials should focus on bringing
9. See infra Part I.A.2.
10. See infra Part I.B.1.
11. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104
Stat. 327 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).

2007]

PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT

437

large systemic cases that advocate specific and concrete
changes. Regarding reasonable accommodations in the
workplace and a public entity’s responsibilities not to discriminate in public programs and services, I will suggest that the
executive branch can more effectively foster flexible solutions in
a context-specific manner.
Federal disability laws have suffered from a lack of structural litigation, or a sustained pattern of cases against large
power structures invoking the power of the courts to oversee
detailed injunctive relief. Drawing examples from public enforcement of predecessor civil rights statutes, I will argue that
these types of cases are an important, yet missing, feature of a
successful antidiscrimination strategy. There are many theoretical and practical reasons why public enforcement authorities
are uniquely suited to bring these cases and set the agenda for
disability civil rights enforcement in a way that private attorney generals cannot currently do. Specifically, I identify two
types of structural cases—claims involving failure to hire and
physical accessibility—that public enforcement officials can and
should be bringing on a systematic basis.
But, in a world where any enforcement official—public or
private—cannot possibly bring every case, supplementary enforcement tools also need to be considered. Recent “new governance” scholarship in fields such as labor and environmental
law posits that regulators should diversify the ways they interact with regulated entities.12 This work focuses on collaborative, multiparty, multilevel, adaptive, problem-solving methods
of public policy implementation that to varying extents supplant or supplement traditional regulation. Importing this
theoretical concept into ADA enforcement yields some important insights. Specifically, I will suggest that to better realize
the ADA’s goals regarding reasonable accommodations in the
workplace and public entities’ responsibilities not to discriminate on the basis of disability, public enforcement officials
should consider nontraditional enforcement options. Ultimately, the goal should be to engage stakeholders in defining these
concepts in a context-specific and mutually acceptable way, rather than requiring courts to interpret and express statutory
rights.
12. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, “New Governance” in Legal Thought
and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89
MINN. L. REV. 471, 471–78 (2004) (providing an explanation of “New Governance” from a leading environmental law expert).
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This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I starts by situating discussions of enforcement within the larger universe of
scholarship critiquing the effectiveness of civil rights law.13
Part I then turns to a discussion of the rise and fall of the role
of the private attorney general in the civil rights arena, a trajectory that opens the door for a renewed discussion of the role
and effectiveness of public enforcement. Part II explains the
need for, and importance of, structural public law litigation in
the disabilities context, and argues that public enforcement officials are theoretically and practically equipped to take the
lead. Failure-to-hire and physical access cases provide concrete
examples where systemic litigation by public officials is needed.
Part III moves beyond litigation, offering a novel application of
new governance theory to ADA enforcement, and concludes
with suggestions on how to maximize the benefits of these alternative types of enforcement activities.
I. THE ROLE OF ENFORCEMENT
There is a strong consensus in the literature (at least
among progressive commentators) that many federal civil
rights statutes—including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the Fair Housing Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act—have not created as much social change as was originally hoped.14 Traditionally, academics have focused on either
13. Although the universe of civil rights laws is technically broader than
antidiscrimination law, there is a large overlap. Because the primary focus of
this Article is on the ADA, which fits both descriptions, I will use the terms
somewhat interchangeably.
14. Regarding Title VII, see, for example, Kathryn Abrams, CrossDressing in the Master’s Clothes, 109 YALE L.J. 745, 758 (2000) (suggesting
that employment discrimination law cannot “actually alter the dominant
norms of most workplaces or the kinds of roles that men and women play within them”); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 20–26 (2006) [hereinafter Bagenstos,
Structural Turn] (arguing that Title VII has proven ill-suited to redistributing
power and remedying unintentional discrimination); Christine A. Littleton,
Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279, 1325–26 (1987) (asserting that Title VII “does not allow for challenges to male bias in the structure of
business, occupations, or jobs”); and Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action Employment Discrimination Litigation and
Its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1331–32 (2003) (arguing that class action
employment litigation has proven ineffective in creating meaningful change).
Regarding the Fair Housing Act, see, for example, Robert G. Schwemm, Private Enforcement and the Fair Housing Act, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 383
(1988) (“Ultimately, in light of the limited changes in the nation’s housing patterns over the past 20 years, one has to ask whether the Fair Housing Act can
ever generate a systematic and effective attack on housing discrimination in
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critiquing court decisions of existing laws or suggesting how
new legislation should be created or current laws modified. For
example, within disability law, commentators have consistently
criticized the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the ADA’s definition of disability.15 There has also been discussion of amending the ADA or other disability law statutes to more effectively
create change in the lives of people with disabilities.16 Criticizthis country. Experience suggests that the answer is ‘No.’”). See also John O.
Calmore, Race/ism Lost and Found: The Fair Housing Act at Thirty, 52 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1067, 1071 (1998) (“Among the modern civil rights laws, fair
housing law persists as the least effective.”); David A. Thomas, Fixing up Fair
Housing Laws: Are We Ready for Reform?, 53 S.C. L. REV. 7, 9 (2001) (characterizing the Fair Housing Act as “ineffective”). Regarding the ADA, see, for example, Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1,
3–4 (2004) (noting the “inability of antidiscrimination laws to eliminate the
deep structural barriers to employment that people with disabilities face”); see
also Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 240 (2001) (showing defendants’ high success rates
in ADA employment cases); and Bonnie Potras Tucker, The ADA’s Revolving
Door: Inherent Flaws in the Civil Rights Paradigm, 62 OHIO ST. L. J. 335, 229
(2001) (arguing that “judicial . . . hostility” has undermined the ADA’s effectiveness).
15. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 488–89 (1999)
(holding that the plaintiffs were not “disabled” within the meaning of the ADA
because eyeglasses improved their vision to 20/20); see also Albertson’s, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565–66 (1999) (holding that plaintiff may not be
protected under the ADA, despite having vision in only one eye, because his
brain has developed subconscious adjustments to compensate for reduced
depth perception); Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 518–19
(1999) (holding that the plaintiff was not protected under the ADA because,
when medicated, his high blood pressure did not prevent him from functioning
normally). For criticism of these decisions, see, for example, Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., “Substantially Limited” Protection from Disability Discrimination:
The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409, 438–512 (1997) (discussing courts’ misconstructions of the ADA’s definition of disability); Aviam Soifer, The Disability Term:
Dignity, Default, and Negative Capability, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1279, 1299–1307
(2000) (discussing courts’ restrictive interpretations of the “regarded as” definition); and Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The Supreme Court’s Definition of Disability Under the ADA: A Return to the Dark Ages, 52 ALA. L. REV. 321, 325–26
(2000) (detailing legislative history that supports determining disability without considering mitigating measures and the Court’s contrary decisions).
Commentators have also noted the restrictive way that courts have interpreted the ADA’s reasonable accommodation provisions. See Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of Employment Discrimination
Law, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 92 (2005) (arguing that, with a different interpretation of “workplace essentialism,” the ADA could have greater impact);
see also Michael Ashley Stein & Michael E. Waterstone, Disability, Disparate
Impact, and Class Actions, 56 DUKE L.J. 861, 874–79 (2007) (arguing for increased group-based challenges to workplace exclusions).
16. For example, in the disability law context, academics and policymakers have discussed a need for some version of an ADA restoration bill. The
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ing a conservative judiciary as undermining civil rights laws, or
suggesting legislative fixes, is of course not unique to disability
law.17
The thrust of the above criticisms is to modify existing statutes or interpretations of these statutes. The predicate argument for substantive change in the law, however, reflects a belief that the law as written is the same as the law in action.
This view increasingly has been challenged.18 Neither the individual rights guaranteed in civil rights statutes nor the larger
antidiscrimination ideals behind them are self enforcing. Statutes can confer only rights; to be meaningful, these rights
primary feature of this project would overturn Supreme Court interpretations
of the definition of disability. See NAT ’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, RIGHTING
THE ADA 99–125 (2004), available at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/
publications/2004/pdf/righting_ada.pdf (proposing an “ADA Restoration Act,”
and noting that “[i]ncisive and forceful legislative action is needed to address
the dramatic narrowing and weakening of the protection provided by the
ADA”); see also Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal AntiDiscrimination Law—What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?,
21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 91–92, 128–29, 162 (2000) (criticizing the
wording of the ADA and suggesting that Congress should amend the definition
of disability). On July 26, 2007, House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer, introduced the ADA Restoration Act of 2007. H.R. 3195, 110th Cong. (2007). Representative Tom Harkin introduced a companion bill in the Senate. S. 1881,
110th Cong. (2007). This bill would amend ADA’s definition of disability. Id.
17. Civil rights advocates outside of disability law dislike a whole range of
Court decisions. General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S.
147 (1982), for example, tightening the reins on class certification in Title VII
cases, has been criticized for beginning the end of employment discrimination
class actions. See Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class Actions Survive?, 37 AKRON L. REV. 813, 820 (2004) (“In the years after the Court
emphasized the importance of adherence to the requirements of Rule 23, the
number of class action suits filed in federal court decreased significantly.”); see
also John A. Tisdale, Deterred Nonapplicants in Title VII Class Actions: Examining the Limits of Equal Employment Opportunity, 64 B.U. L. REV. 151,
171 (1984) (noting the Falcon opinion’s role in the new, closer adherence to
Rule 23 requirements in Title VII suits). On the legislative side, within the
larger universe of employment discrimination law, Congress amended Title
VII of the Civil Rights of 1964 in 1991 to make punitive and compensatory
damages available to plaintiffs claiming intentional discrimination, finding
that “additional remedies under Federal law are needed to deter . . . intentional discrimination in the workplace.” Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(a)(1) (2000)). Similarly, the Fair Housing Act was amended in 1988 to
remove the cap on punitive damages. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988,
Pub. L. 100-430, § 813, 102 Stat. 1619, 1633 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 3613(c) (2000)).
18. See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) (taking a pessimistic view of
the ability of law to create social change without the support of the executive
branch and the public).
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must be defended from intrusion or violation, often in court.
The scholarship identifying and critiquing this process increasingly has focused on the role and limitations of private enforcement,19 with public enforcement being little more than an
afterthought or an option that is dismissed out of hand.20 Because the role of private enforcement is an important part of
why I believe a more robust discussion of public enforcement is
needed, in this Section I will briefly summarize the rise and fall
of the civil rights private attorney general. I argue that the continuation of this discussion—which has not yet taken place—
should focus on public enforcement.
A. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
1. Background and Rise of Private Enforcement
The concepts of private enforcement and the private attorney general can mean several different things.21 Most broadly,
any plaintiff whose private lawsuit vindicates the public interest by deterring unlawful behavior can be viewed as one variant of a “private attorney general.”22 Over time, however, an
19. See, e.g., Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural
Attack on Civil Rights: The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private
Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1087, 1131–34 (2007) (arguing that court
decisions have negative effects for private organizations that bring civil rights
cases); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Perversity of Limited Civil Rights Remedies:
The Case of “Abusive” ADA Litigation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2006) (critiquing
private enforcement of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act); Bryant
Garth et al., The Institution of the Private Attorney General: Perspectives from
an Empirical Study of Class Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 357
(1988) (undertaking an empirical study of cases brought by private attorneys
general and concluding in part that their effectiveness “depends in crucial respects on a combination of private initiative and governmental commitment to
regulation and enforcement”); Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183, 187 (discussing court decisions that undermine the private attorney general’s ability to prosecute civil rights cases);
William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why It
Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2133–37 (2004) (describing the historical development of the private attorney general concept); Robert G. Schwemm, Private Enforcement and the Fair Housing Act, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 379–
81 (1988) (illustrating the limitations of private enforcement of the Fair Housing Act); Selmi, supra note 14, at 1324–31 (arguing that the lack of governmental monitoring in civil rights class actions brought by private lawyers undermines their effectiveness in producing social change).
20. See infra notes 74–75 and accompanying text.
21. As academic lore has it, the term “private attorney general” was first
used in Judge Jerome Frank’s opinion in Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134
F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943). See Garth et al., supra note 19, at 357.
22. See Rubenstein, supra note 19, at 2133–35.
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increasingly developed body of case law and literature has refined the concept. Within the civil rights arena, a private attorney general is a private citizen whose lawsuit, while perhaps
benefiting her, also works to the advantage of the public by
eliminating discriminatory behavior.23 Traditionally, federal
civil rights statutes have offered the possibility of attorneys
fees and damage awards (presumably shared with the plaintiff’s lawyer under a contingency fee arrangement) to entice
private lawyers to take these cases.24
Initially a “progressive” legal reform,”25 the private attorney general incentives in the enforcement of civil rights had
support from both sides of the political aisle. Conservatives
championed the role of the private attorney general because it
privatized enforcement, thus shrinking the role of the federal
government; and liberals supported private actors enforcing
civil rights because it freed up civil rights enforcement from
any conservative political agenda or administration.26
Importantly, during the 1960s and 1970s, there was a pattern of vigorous private civil rights enforcement by public interest organizations.27 These lawyers—who in and of them23. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (“When
a plaintiff obtains an injunction [under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964],
he does so not for himself alone but also as a ‘private attorney general,’ vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.”); see also H.R.
REP. NO. 94-1558, at 1 (1976) (“The effective enforcement of Federal civil
rights statutes depends largely on the efforts of private citizens. Although
some agencies of the United States have civil rights responsibilities, their authority and resources are limited. In many instances where these laws are violated, it is necessary for the citizen to initiate court action to correct the illegality.”).
24. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 129 (6th ed. 1990) (subdefinition of “Attorney General”) (“The ‘private attorney general’ concept holds that a successful private party plaintiff is entitled to recovery of his legal expenses, including attorneys fees, if he has advanced the policy inherent in public interest
legislation on behalf of a significant class of persons.”).
25. Garth et al., supra note 19, at 354.
26. Id.; see also Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1387 (2000) (advocating a private enforcement model
“that harnesses the power of private citizens to reform unconstitutional practices, particularly in the . . . area of police-related rights violations”).
27. These organizations are sometimes referred to as “social advocate”
private attorneys general. See Garth et al., supra note 19, at 358 n.17. On the
role of the NAACP in enforcing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see generally
JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS (1994). On the role of the ACLU
along with the NAACP, see JOEL F. HANDLER ET AL., LAWYERS AND THE
PURSUIT OF LEGAL RIGHTS 22–24 (1978); see also Louise G. Trubek, Crossing
Boundaries: Legal Education and the Challenge of the “New Public Interest
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selves were considered private attorneys general28—were generally financed by a blend of foundation and public money (the
latter being primarily through the Legal Services Corporation
(LSC)).29 The procedural vehicle of choice for these lawyers was
the civil rights class action.30 There was a sort of symbiosis between the public-interest-minded private attorney general and
the judicial and political systems.31
2. Backlash Against Private Enforcement
To the extent that this was a golden or even classic era,32 it
did not last very long. The private attorney general as enforcer
of civil rights soon faced a multilevel assault by the courts and
Congress. In Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West
Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources,33 the
Court dramatically changed the ways that plaintiffs could recover attorneys’ fees in civil rights cases. Rather than qualifyLaw,” 2005 WIS. L. REV. 455, 456–61 (characterizing the 1960s and 1970s as
the “classic” era of public interest law).
28. See Rubenstein, supra note 19, at 2146–48.
29. See Garth et al., supra note 19, at 359–60 (noting that in the late
1960s and 1970s the private attorney general “was supported by money from
government and large foundations”). See also Joshua D. Blank & Eric A.
Zacks, Dismissing the Class: A Practical Approach to the Class Action Restriction on the Legal Services Corporation, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 6 (2005) (noting that “the Carter administration increased funding for the [LSC] and generally supported its goals”); Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, After Public
Interest Law, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1251, 1253–54 (“[F]ederal legal services lawyers won almost two thirds of the eighty cases they argued to the United
States Supreme Court through the mid-1970s, including landmark cases like
Goldberg v. Kelly, which had far-reaching implications for the poor.” (footnotes
omitted)).
30. See Garth et al., supra note 19, at 355 (“The class action suit is the
principal procedural mechanism characteristic of the private attorney general.”); see also Robert L. Carter, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a Vindicator for Civil Rights, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2179, 2184–85 (1989) (“The device
of the class action is closely associated with the figure of the ‘private attorney
general.’”); Jack Greenberg, Civil Rights Class Actions: Procedural Means of
Obtaining Substance, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 575, 577 (1997).
31. The government nurtured these lawyers and their work through the
LSC. See Garth et al., supra note 19, at 370 (noting the role of the LSC in
funding class action work). The revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1966 contributed to a climate in which “the existence of structural opportunities and organizational resources fed a sense of optimism about the
power of law to change society. A receptive federal judiciary, centralized federal agencies, and robust social welfare programs permitted public interest lawyers to extend rights, reform bureaucratic rules, and amplify government benefits.” Cummings & Eagly, supra note 29, at 1253.
32. See Trubek, supra note 27, at 456–57.
33. 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
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ing as “prevailing parties” by showing that their lawsuit was a
catalyst for voluntary change by the defendant (the previously
accepted “catalyst theory”), the Court held that plaintiffs must
achieve a “material alteration of the legal relationship of the
parties,” such as a favorable judgment on the merits or a consent decree.34 This judicially imposed limitation has undermined the ability of the private attorney general to bring cases
for injunctive relief.35 In other cases the Court has curtailed
Congress’s ability to authorize private damage suits against
states36 and restricted private rights of action to enforce the
disparate impact regulations promulgated under Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.37
Perhaps unintentionally, statutory developments have also
been unkind to the private attorney general. In 1991, Congress
amended Title VII to allow plaintiffs claiming intentional discrimination to seek compensatory and punitive damages and to
request jury trials.38 These changes were intended to bolster
the private enforcement scheme.39 Ironically, however, by complicating the class certification inquiry, they have stymied the
ability of the private parties and their lawyers to bring civil
rights class actions.40
34. Id. at 604.
35. See Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 19, at 1088–92 (discussing Buckhannon’s negative effects on private organizations that bring civil rights cases).
36. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001)
(holding that a private litigant could not bring a damage claim under Title I of
the ADA against Alabama).
37. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (holding that
Title VI was not intended “to create a freestanding private right of action . . . .
[T]herefore . . . no such right of action exists.”). On the judiciary’s assault on
the private attorney general, see Karlan, supra note 19, at 186 (“[T]he Court
has launched a wholesale assault on one of the primary mechanisms Congress
has used for enforcing civil rights: the private attorney general.”).
38. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071,
1072 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(a)(1), (c) (2000)).
39. See id.
40. See Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 407–10 (5th Cir.
1998) (finding that, although the case could have proceeded as a class action
before passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, that statute “ultimately render[s] this case unsuitable for class certification under Rule 23”). But see Hart,
supra note 17, at 835–45 (arguing that real reasons courts will not certify employment class actions after the Civil Rights Act of 1991 have to do with perceptions that class actions are unfair, force defendants into blackmail settlements, and are no longer necessary). For a discussion of why these restrictions
do not similarly impact government lawyers, see infra notes 146–52 and accompanying text.
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The political capital and popularity of the civil rights plaintiffs’ bar has also faded. The first step was the dismantling of
the (LSC). Organizations that had been effective private attorneys general in civil rights cases had their funds cut.41 Then, in
1996, Congress enacted a series of restrictions on the LSC, including prohibiting organizations that receive funding from the
Corporation from bringing class actions.42 This was devastating
to the LSC’s ability to prosecute large cases on the public’s behalf.43
The civil rights private attorney general came to be viewed
less as a social advocate and more akin to his mass tort or securities counterpart.44 The recent passage of the Class Action
41. In 1982, the Reagan administration attempted to eliminate the LSC
altogether. Blank & Zacks, supra note 29, at 6; see also William P. Quigley,
The Demise of Law Reform and the Triumph of Legal Aid: Congress and the
Legal Services Corporation from the 1960’s to the 1990’s, 17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB.
L. REV. 241, 255–56 (1998) (noting that the Reagan budget scheduled the LSC
for termination). Although this did not happen, the LSC’s budget was continuously and dramatically reduced. See American Bar Association, Legal Services Corporation, http://www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/lsc.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2007) (reporting that Congress reduced the LSC budget from
$400 million to $278 million in 1996); see also Katja Cerovsek & Kathleen
Kerr, Opening the Doors to Justice: Overcoming the Problem of Inadequate Representation for the Indigent, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 697, 698 (2004) (“In
2002, the federal government allocated only $329 million dollars in 2002 to the
Legal Services Corporation (LSC), a decrease from the $400 million allocated
in 1995. The LSC allocation is $21 million below the 1981 level and far below
the $600 million that would be the inflationary equivalent of the 1981 levels.”
(citations omitted) (quoting Simran Bindra & Pedram Ben-Cohen, Public Civil
Defenders: A Right to Counsel for Indigent Civil Defendants, 10 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 4 (2003))).
42. Omnibus Consolidated Recessions and Appropriations Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321. The class action restriction is found in
section 504(a)(7) of the Act.
43. See BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, RESTRICTING LEGAL SERVICES:
HOW CONGRESS LEFT THE POOR WITH ONLY HALF A LAWYER 9 (2000), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/atj2.pdf (“To understand just how the restrictions [in the 1996 law] are hurting poor clients, it is
useful to look at a tool that LSC-funded lawyers used to be able to use on their
behalf: the class-action suit.”); see also Blank & Zacks, supra note 29, at 3 (“It
is probable that since 1996, legal services lawyers have been prevented from
filing a significant number of potential class action lawsuits.”); David C. Leven, Justice for the Forgotten and Despised, 16 TOURO L. REV. 1, 12–14 (1999).
These restrictions meant that LSC-funded entities focused more on smaller,
individual cases; those involving unemployment benefits, for example. See
Christine Jolls, The Role and the Functioning of Public-Interest Legal Organizations in the Enforcement of Employment Laws, in EMERGING LABOR MARKET
INSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 141, 167–68 (Richard B.
Freeman et al. eds., 2005).
44. See Garth et al., supra note 19, at 360–65 (arguing that the private

446

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[92:434

Fairness Act (CAFA)45 demonstrates the decreased political
power of the plaintiffs’ civil rights bar. Amongst other things,
CAFA moves certain class action cases from state to federal
court46 on the stated rationale that the civil litigation system
had been abused by plaintiffs’ class action lawyers.47 Various
civil rights groups argued that CAFA was unnecessary in civil
rights cases because there was no history of civil rights class
action abuses in state court.48 Despite vehement pursuit, the
civil rights community was unable to get a carve-out for civil
rights class actions.49
Commentators also soured on the private attorney general.
In a series of articles in the 1980s, Professor John Coffee
started questioning the extent to which we could “sensibly rely
on private litigation as a method of law enforcement.”50 In critiattorney general is no longer seen as a social advocate in light of economic interests); Tristin K. Green, Targeting Workplace Context: Title VII as a Tool for
Institutional Reform, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 659, 661 (2003) (“The large money
stakes involved in many recent cases make it tempting to view the cases as
just another form of mass tort, wherein the parties bargain to place a price on
the risk of workplace discrimination.”); see also Selmi, supra note 14, at 1280
(“[T]his model—where the money that changes hands is more important than
structural reforms—has transformed civil rights class action litigation into
something more akin to torts or consumer class actions . . . .”).
45. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–1715 (2000 & Supp. IV
2006)).
46. CAFA amends 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the federal diversity jurisdiction statute, to vest the district courts with original jurisdiction of any class action in
which the matter in controversy exceeds $5 million, exclusive of interest and
costs, and that is between citizens of different states, or citizens of a state and
a foreign state or its citizens and subjects. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1711(a)(1).
48. Civil rights advocates even argued that CAFA would harm civil rights
because it could move cases under more expansive state law civil rights statutes into federal court, and it would slow the resolution of federal civil rights
cases because the expansion of federal jurisdiction would further bog down
federal courts. See Letter from Leadership Conference on Civil Rights to U.S.
Senate (Sept. 6, 2003), available at http://www.aclu.org/rightsofthepoor/gen/
13468leg20030916.html (urging opposition to S. 274, the Class Action Fairness
Act of 2003); see also Alan B. Morrison, Removing Class Actions to Federal
Court: A Better Way to Handle the Problem of Overlapping Class Actions, 57
STAN. L. REV. 1521, 1540 (2005) (noting opposition of a civil rights bar to
CAFA).
49. There is such a carve-out for securities class action cases, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)(9)(A), which are already regulated by the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (2000)).
50. John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the
Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215,

2007]

PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT

447

cizing the private attorney general as a legal institution that
had not lived up to its early promise to promote the public interest, Coffee noted that private lawyers may have different incentives than their clients, which leads to either poor representation (where plaintiffs’ lawyers sell out their clients) or
excessive litigation (because the parties to the litigation do not
bear its costs).51 Although Professor Coffee’s work focused on
securities litigation, his basic criticisms have recently been extended to the civil rights private attorney general. Professor
Michael Selmi conducted a recent study of high-profile employment class action cases with large settlements, all of which
were brought by the private bar.52 Professor Selmi found, quite
discouragingly, that these cases have little or no effect on stock
price, create little or no meaningful substantive change within
corporations, and produce only modest financial benefits for
class members, despite the fact that the remedial focus of these
cases was monetary relief.53 He concludes that one of the few
things these cases actually accomplished was enriching the
lawyers that were involved.54
3. The ADA and the Private Attorney General
Enacted at a time when Congress still professed a belief in
the private attorney general but courts and the public had
turned against it, the ADA has become a prime example of the
concept’s limited utility. Like the Fair Housing Act and Title
VII, the ADA is heavily dependent on private enforcement.
Each title of the ADA allows for a private right of action.55 Under Title I (discrimination in employment), an aggrieved plaintiff can file a lawsuit after receiving a right-to-sue letter from
the EEOC.56 An individual may then sue for compensatory and
218 (1983).
51. Id. at 220. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of
Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 676–90
(1986) (noting the different incentives for plaintiff attorneys and the effects on
social benefits).
52. See Selmi, supra note 14, at 1252–68.
53. See, e.g., id. at 1250, 1321.
54. Id. at 1275, 1285, 1292; Deborah R. Hensler & Thomas D. Rowe, Jr.,
Beyond “It Just Ain’t Worth It”: Alternative Strategies for Damage Class Action
Reform, 64 LAW & COMTEMP. PROBS. 137, 137–38 (2001) (noting the negative
effects of private class action litigation).
55. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104
Stat. 327 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
56. Id.
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punitive damages and request a jury trial.57 Under Title II (discrimination by public entities), an individual may file a lawsuit.58 Compensatory, but not punitive, damages are allowed.59
Under Title III (discrimination in privately owned places of
public accommodation), an individual may bring a private lawsuit but they are limited to injunctive relief.60
The private attorney general project under the ADA has
not gone well.61 Where damages are available within Title I,
poor victims of discrimination have difficulty finding lawyers.62
Within Title II, courts have taken a narrow view of when private litigants can obtain compensatory damages,63 and the Supreme Court has drastically limited the availability of damages
through its expansion of sovereign immunity.64 Finally, Title
III never contained any claims for damages, and, as might be
expected, it has the lowest number of cases of any part of the
statute.65
57. The remedies and enforcement of Title I of the ADA are those provided by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including the 1991 amendments. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
58. Id. § 12133 (“The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in section
794a of Title 29 shall be the remedies, procedures, and rights that this title
provides to any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of [Title II].”).
59. See Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189 (2002) (holding punitive
damages unavailable under section 202 of the ADA).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a) (2000) (“The remedies and procedures set forth in
section 2000a-3(a) of this title are the remedies and procedures this title provides to any person who is being subjected to discrimination on the basis of
disability in violation of this subchapter.”). The cited section only includes
prospective injunctive relief. Id. § 2000a-3(a).
61. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 19 (critiquing private enforcement of
Title III); see also Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1853–74 (2005) (arguing that Titles II and III of the ADA are underenforced).
62. See Louis S. Rulli & Jason A. Leckerman, Unfinished Business: The
Fading Promise of ADA Enforcement in the Federal Courts Under Title I and
Its Impact on the Poor, 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 595, 631–47 (2005).
63. See e.g., Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138–39 (9th Cir.
2001) (limiting compensatory damages under Title II to cases of “deliberate
indifference”).
64. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001)
(holding that the ADA improperly infringes upon state sovereignty); see also
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 534–34 (2004) (holding that state sovereign
immunity was validly abrogated in claims involving access to courts under
Title II); Michael E. Waterstone, Lane, Fundamental Rights, and Voting, 56
ALA. L. REV. 793, 794–801 (2005) (discussing the role of the ADA in the
Court’s sovereign immunity decisions).
65. As of 2001, there were 720 Title I cases that made it to the courts of
appeals, and as of 2004, there were 197 Title II cases that made it to the
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Despite these limitations, the popular image of private enforcement under the ADA has been fairly negative. The harsh
portrayal of the ADA in the print and other media has been
well documented.66 Besides generalized hostility to the ADA, a
negative view of the lawyers bringing these cases and their
clients is a theme running through media accounts of ADA cases.67
B. PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT
This Article takes the current limitations of and hostile
climate surrounding the private attorney general as a given.68
Are we condemned to civil rights laws only offering a “hollow
hope”?69 Or are there other enforcement strategies that might
be studied and ultimately pursued? Focusing primarily on the
ADA, this Article discusses litigation by public officials and
new governance forms of enforcement. Both of the following
Sections will present a more forceful role for public enforcement
officials.
1. Why Discuss Public Enforcement?
The decline of the private attorney general seemingly
creates an opportunity to refocus on the other available means
of enforcement—that by government officials. But by and large,
a discussion of why this is so, what it might look like, and how
it might work, has not yet taken place. Public civil rights enforcement has never been much of an issue in presidential
courts of appeals, and 82 Title III cases. See Waterstone, supra note 61, at
1853.
66. See, e.g., Cary LaCheen, Achy Breaky Pelvis, Lumber Lung and Juggler’s Despair: The Portrayal of the Americans with Disabilities Act on Television and Radio, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 223 (2000) (discussing the
negative portrayal of the ADA in media).
67. See id. at 227–31 (“One explanation for many people’s distaste for the
enforcement of the ADA via serial litigation is that the plaintiffs and their attorneys stand to financially gain from each of the suits they file.”).
68. It is not that these developments are unimportant—very much to the
contrary. The ideas to revive the private attorney general are relatively
straightforward and usually involve legislatively overruling Buckhannon and
increasing damage awards in civil rights cases. See Kyle A. Loring, Note, The
Catalyst Theory Meets the Supreme Court—Common Sense Takes a Vacation,
43 B.C. L. REV. 973, 974 (2002) (proposing that Congress overturn Buckhannon); see also Selmi, supra note 14, at 1328–29 (suggesting a modification of
fee incentives for private lawyers in civil rights class actions). If the legislative
pendulum swings, however, and Congress enacts reform to make private litigation more effective, the importance of public enforcement could lessen.
69. ROSENBERG, supra note 18, at 336–43.
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campaigns,70 despite the fact that the means and methods of
public enforcement of civil rights is largely a presidential prerogative.71 Existing academic commentary has proposed narrow
areas of targeted enforcement72 or focused only on the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).73 An undercurrent running through the larger body of work on private en70. The “major newspapers” database in LexisNexis for coverage of the
candidates’ positions on public enforcement of civil rights laws in the 2000 and
2004 presidential elections includes United States newspapers with circulation rates in the top fifty, and English-language newspapers published outside
the United States that have circulation rates in their own countries’ top five
percent or are listed as national newspapers in Benn’s World Media Dictionary. In a search time frame set at one year before each election the following
results were yielded: in the 2004 presidential election, the only campaignrelated coverage of public civil rights enforcement related to the Bush administration’s decision to transfer enforcement of partial-birth abortion legislation
to the Civil Rights division of the Department of Justice (DOJ). See Dana Milbank, Bush Signs Ban on Late-Term Abortions into Effect; Civil Rights Agency
to Enforce Law; Lawsuits Filed, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2003, at A23; see also Julian Borger, Fury at Bush’s Civil Rights Policing of Abortion Ban, GUARDIAN,
Nov. 8, 2003, at 15. For information on the Justice Department’s preparations
to enforce voting rights in the election, see Tom Brune, A Record Deployment:
Feds Plan to Monitor Voting Rights Tuesday, NEWSDAY, Oct. 29, 2004, at A4.
In the 2000 presidential election, there were only five campaign-related articles mentioning public enforcement of civil rights laws, three of which reported on a speech then-candidate Bush made to the NAACP in July of 2000.
See Jena Heath, Bush Vows to Enforce Rights: He Pledges to Work to End
Prosperity Gap, ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 11, 2000, at A3 (stating that Bush
pledged to make civil rights enforcement a “cornerstone” of his administration
if he won the presidency).
71. See, e.g., AUGUSTUS J. JONES, LAW, BUREAUCRACY AND POLITICS: THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 15–41
(1982) (highlighting the role of presidential decision making in civil rights enforcement).
72. See, e.g., Holly James McMickle, Letting DOJ Lead the Way: Why
DOJ’s Pattern or Practice Authority Is the Most Effective Tool to Control Racial
Profiling, 13 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 311, 312 (2003) (arguing that the
DOJ should control racial profiling); Sara Robenbaum & Joel Teitelbaum, Civil Rights Enforcement in the Modern Healthcare System: Reinvigorating the
Role of the Federal Government in the Aftermath of Alexander v. Sandoval, 3
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 215, 219 (2003) (proposing to “grant civil
rights enforcement to federal agencies with power to make expenditure decisions”).
73. See Kathryn Moss et al., Unfunded Mandate: An Empirical Study of
the Implementation of the Americans with Disabilities Act by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 5 (2001); Michael
Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency’s Role in Employment
Discrimination Law, 57 OHIO ST. L. J. 1, 1–4 (1996) [hereinafter Selmi,
EEOC]. But see Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights:
The Cases of Housing and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1403 (1998)
[hereinafter Selmi, Public vs. Private] (concluding the private bar is a more
effective vehicle to enforce Title VII and the Fair Housing Act).
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forcement seems to be that government enforcers do not have
enough resources to make a difference,74 or that the political
nature of civil rights means that public enforcement cannot be
trusted.75
Most public enforcement officials are essentially administrative agencies. At the most general level, there are criticisms
that vesting administrative agencies with broad powers inevitably leads to administrative capture, whereby the private interests of regulated groups tend to drive policy decisions to the
point where agencies are no longer acting in the “public interest.”76 Slightly less pessimistically, public choice theorists focus
on understanding administrative decision making as being the
product of the relationship between interest groups and government officials trying to protect their own interests.77 More
specifically, Professor Selmi has opined that the government is
inherently poorly suited to enforce civil rights given the behavioral incentives of its attorneys, including a desire for trial experience, lack of financial interest in the case, and desire to
avoid controversial cases.
To be sure, these views have power, and were essentially
the rationale for the creation of the private attorney general in
74. See Adam Milani, Wheelchair Users Who Lack “Standing”: Another
Procedural Threshold Blocking Enforcement of Titles II and III of the ADA, 39
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 69, 112–13 (2004) (noting the “small cadre of lawyers”
in the DOJ’s Disability Rights Section).
75. See Leroy D. Clark, The Future Civil Rights Agenda: Speculation on
Litigation, Legislation, and Organization, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 795, 818 (1989)
(noting the federal government’s “abdication of aggressive enforcement role”);
see also Bagenstos, supra note 19, at 35 (“Government enforcers have limited
resources in the best of times, and recent years have made painfully apparent
just how much the vigor of government enforcement can vary with the political
winds.”); Selmi, Public vs. Private, supra note 73, at 1439 (“[T]he political nature of civil rights and the nature of the attorneys entrusted with enforcing
civil rights laws mean that the government inevitably acts cautiously—
choosing to pursue only those cases that are near certain winners or that are
politically uncontroversial.”).
76. Mark C. Niles, On the Hijacking of Agencies (and Airplanes): The Federal Aviation Administration, “Agency Capture,” and Airline Security, 10 AM.
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 381, 387–88 (2002); see Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency Discretion, 51
ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 459 (1999) (noting that broad agency discretion could
mean that special interest groups would dominate).
77. See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 543, 561 (2000) (characterizing administrative decision making as involving “interest group pressure brought to bear on bureaucrats seeking rewards such as job security, enhanced authority, or the favor of powerful legislators upon whom the agency depends”).
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the first place. But for several reasons, none should be conversation stoppers regarding public enforcement. First, the recent
broad and systemic undermining of the private attorney general discussed above demands an exploration of different enforcement alternatives. Second, it is clearly true that decisions
about governmental enforcement priorities and resources are
subject to the political process. Rather than an end point, however, this creates an opportunity to influence change in this
arena. Although traditionally below the public’s political radar,
our public officials (and by extension, the polity) are constantly
making decisions about how to fund, organize, or even eliminate public enforcement entities.78 It is therefore important to
stimulate a discussion on why public enforcement is needed
and how it can be effective. At the very least, this effort can
provide guidance when the political pendulum swings in a pro–
civil rights direction.79 Finally, the view that political volatility
renders public enforcement inherently suspect may be overstated. Although the evidence is somewhat mixed,80 some commentators have found similar enforcement patterns in both Republican and Democratic administrations.81
Moreover, this Article is not so much arguing for an expansion of the role of the public enforcement vis-à-vis the private
attorney general (although, for the reasons I have discussed
above, in the real world the private attorney general’s role has
diminished). Instead, I am advocating that public enforcement
agencies perform the role that they are already tasked with
more effectively. I take as a given—and support—the idea that
78. See, e.g., Selmi, EEOC, supra note 73, at 57–59 (proposing to eliminate the EEOC).
79. The author thanks Sam Bagenstos for helping to develop this point.
80. See TRANSACTION RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, CIVIL RIGHTS
ENFORCEMENT BY BUSH ADMINISTRATION LAGS, http://trac.syr.edu/
tracreports/civright/106/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2007) (“Key data from the Justice
Department and the federal courts show that the government’s enforcement of
civil rights cases—an extremely rare event under all recent presidents—
sharply declined during the Bush years.”). Of late, there have also been accounts of politicization of the Justice Department, and the Civil Rights Division in particular. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Justice Dept. Reshapes Its Civil
Rights Mission, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2007, at A1.
81. See Selmi, Public vs. Private, supra note 73, at 1430–31 (concluding
that there were no significant differences in EEOC employment discrimination
enforcement between Republican and Democratic administrations); Jeffrey H.
Orleans, An End to the Odyssey: Equal Athletic Opportunities for Women, 3
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 131, 138 (1996) (noting that neither the George
H.W. Bush nor Clinton administrations were “aggressive” in enforcing Title
IX).
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the ADA and other antidiscrimination statutes allow for both
public and private enforcement.82 This diffusion of enforcement
power avoids some capture problems, to the extent they exist.83
To be sure, my proposals for more effective and robust public
enforcement might take the enforcers in a more aggressive direction than their “natural” incentives might otherwise take
them. Civil rights enforcement is political,84 and strong executive leadership—something that the ADA had at its passage85—is needed to shake public enforcement agencies from
their path dependent behaviors.86 This is especially needed
with the ADA. Deemed the “first true civil rights legislation of
the 21st century,”87 the Warren Court, as well as the Kennedy
and Johnson administrations, never had the opportunity to interpret this statute.88
2. The Case for Public Enforcement
The broad theoretical case for a renewed emphasis on public enforcement is surprisingly easy to make. As any high
school civics student should know, the President is responsible
for executing the laws of the United States.89 The various enforcement apparatuses of the executive branch are similarly
82. A primary criticism of the Help America Vote Act has been its lack of
a private remedy. See Michael Waterstone, Constitutional and Statutory Voting Rights for People with Disabilities, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 353, 382
(2003).
83. See Seidenfeld, supra note 76, at 459 (1999) (noting that broad agency
discretion could mean that special interest groups would dominate). There is
no literature I know of suggesting the two enforcement agencies I will be discussing below, the Department of Justice and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, have been “captured” in any relevant sense by any entity
under their jurisdiction.
84. Professor Selmi likely shares this view. See Selmi, Public v. Private,
supra note 73, at 1444 (discussing the “politically infused” nature of civil
rights litigation).
85. President George H.W. Bush was a visible supporter of the ADA, and
used his political capital to help ensure the Act’s passage. See Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a
Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 414
n.3, 420, 437, 495, 520 (1991).
86. See infra Part II.A (defining the “path dependent behaviors”).
87. Letter from the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights to J. Dennis
Hastert, Speaker of the House, U.S. House of Representatives (July 26, 2002),
available at http:// www.nlchp.org/ content/pubs/CR_voting_letter.pdf.
88. On the civil rights enforcement efforts of the Kennedy and Johnson
administrations, see infra note 100.
89. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4 (“[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.”).
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tasked.90 When the government enforces any set of laws, it acts
as a representative of its people. Therefore, when the government enforces the antidiscrimination ideals contained in civil
rights statutes, it expresses the will of the people to live in a
more just society. This expressive function of the law cannot be
completely outsourced to private actors91 and is lost when civil
rights lawsuits become profit-driven enterprises.92 More globally, when the private market fails to provide a particular public
good,93 the government has an obligation to do so for the betterment of its people.94
As Gerald Rosenberg recognized over a decade ago, the executive branch’s support is a necessary condition for meaningful change in the civil rights arena.95 Experience suggests that
Rosenberg is right. Before Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 was passed, African Americans were customarily denied
access to public places in the Jim Crow South.96 The Civil
Rights Act played a major role in ending these pernicious practices.97 Similarly, during that same era, literacy tests and other
forms of subtle and overt discrimination regularly denied African Americans the right to vote.98 The Voting Rights Act has
been judged a historical success in eliminating overt racial dis90. See Larry W. Yackle, A Worthy Champion for Fourteenth Amendment
Rights: The United States in Parens Patriae, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 111, 116–17
(1997).
91. See Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86
VA. L. REV. 1649, 1652 (2000) (dismissing the relationship between legal signals and societal expectations); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function
of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021–25 (1996).
92. See Green, supra note 44, at 722–23 (discussing the desirability of the
EEOC’s role in protecting the public interest through Title VII systemic cases).
93. In this case, one form of the “public good” would be meritorious cases
that would enforce the civil rights laws. As will be discussed below in more detail, the private market is not adequately serving this public good. See Julie
Davies, Federal Civil Rights Practice in the 1990’s: The Dichotomy Between
Reality and Theory, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 197, 238, 242 (1997) (observing that the
market for civil rights class actions is “dramatically underserved” and meritorious claims are not being brought).
94. See Jolls, supra note 43, at 9.
95. ROSENBERG, supra note 18, at 36.
96. See BROOKS ET AL., supra note 3, at 267 (“Prior to the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, racial segregation was an accepted way of American life.”).
97. See, e.g., HARRELL R. RODGERS, JR. & CHARLES S. BULLOCK, III, LAW
AND SOCIAL CHANGE 66 (1972) (discussing the impact of the Civil Rights Act
in the South); Drew S. Days, III, “Feedback Loop”: The Civil Rights Act of 1964
and Its Progeny, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 981, 981 (2005) (“This legislation has
brought broad, positive change and progress to American society.”).
98. See BROOKS ET AL., supra note 3, at 560–61.
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crimination in voting.99 The successes of these statutes have
been in large part attributed to aggressive enforcement by public enforcement authorities.100
I now turn to the issue of what exactly public enforcement
authorities can and should be doing differently. While I am
specifically focused on the ADA, the arguments herein should
offer valuable insights for the larger universe of antidiscrimination and civil rights law.
II. STRUCTURAL LITIGATION
The traditional civil litigation model is bilateral and seeks
adjudication of specific grievances. This type of case is relatively self-contained and primarily asks for retrospective remedies.101 What has been alternatively termed public law, structural, or systemic litigation, in contrast, is different.102
Although there is no uniform definition for this type of litigation, I will use it to describe cases that are filed against large
corporations or government entities or other large power structures, and seek structural remedies, meaning that they invoke
the power of the courts to oversee institutional reform.103 They
99. See id. at 577–78; Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman, Editors’
Introduction to QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT, 1965–1990, at 3, 3 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds.,
1994).
100. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS
ENFORCEMENT EFFORT 10 (1971) (“Within a few months after enactment, the
Department . . . brought several enforcement actions that tested the constitutionality of the public accommodations law.”); see also RICHARD CORTNER,
CIVIL RIGHTS AND PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS: THE HEART OF ATLANTA MOTEL
AND MCCLUNG CASES 27 (2001) (“If the enforcement of the Civil Rights Act
was to occur in the courts, rather in the streets as President Johnson feared,
the primary burden would fall on the Civil Rights Division of the Department
of Justice, headed by Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall.”). Cortner
proceeds throughout this book to note the key contributions made by the Civil
Rights Division and the efforts of Marshall in particular. See generally id.
101. See Abe Chayes, The Role of Justice in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282 (1976).
102. Commentators use these terms interchangeably. See JOHN C.
JEFFRIES ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: ENFORCING THE CONSTITUTION 745
(2000) (“Suits of this type have come to be known as ‘structural reform,’ or ‘institutional’ or ‘public law’ litigation.”). I will do the same.
103. See id. (“Other cases, however, involve broader attacks on the way
government does business. Such suits are typically brought as class actions for
injunctive relief. Often they seek systemic reform of government operations or
procedures, relief that far exceeds any preventative or compensatory objective
that would make whole any particular plaintiff before the court.”); see also
Maimon Schwarzchild, Public Law by Private Bargain: Title VII Consent De-
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are usually brought as class actions.104 Although certain commentators have questioned the procedural and remedial fairness of these institutional cases,105 there is a strong counterargument if not consensus about the propriety and effectiveness
of structural reform litigation.106
In any event, the effectiveness of structural litigation in reforming institutions cannot be disputed. Structural litigation
campaigns have desegregated schools,107 reformed prisons,108
attacked deplorable health care conditions in institutions,109
challenged police abuse,110 and targeted discrimination in large

crees and the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 DUKE L. J.
887, 888–90 (discussing how large-scale Title VII lawsuits against private
companies are public law litigation, whereby courts take responsibility for extensive institutional reforms while acting independently of the adversarial
process).
104. See JEFFRIES ET AL., supra note 102, at 745.
105. See Gerald E. Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L.
REV. 715, 733 (1978) (criticizing institutional cases as examples of judicial violations of the separation of powers); see also Robert F. Nagel, Separation of
Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661,
661–62 (1978) (criticizing the judiciary’s use of new and expansive remedies).
106. See Chayes, supra note 101, at 1316 (arguing that involving courts
and judges in public law litigation is legitimate and inevitable if justice is to be
done in an increasingly regulated society); see also Owen M. Fiss, Foreword:
The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1–4 (1979) (arguing that structural
litigation serves as a means for the judicial branch to articulate constitutional
values, which is necessary to create change in large-scale public organizations).
107. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that racial segregation in public schools was unconstitutional).
108. See, e.g., Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curiam) (affirming the lower court’s holding that racial segregation of prisons violated the
Equal Protection Clause); see also Greenberg, supra note 30, at 577 (“Since the
federal class action rule was revised in 1966, prisoners’ rights litigation has
utilized the mechanism of class action to bring broad relief to inmates and detainees throughout the country.”).
109. See, e.g., N.Y. State Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 393 F.
Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (addressing conditions in the Willowbrook institution for the developmentally disabled in New York City).
110. The Department of Justice has negotiated consent decrees with various police departments, requiring, among other things, revision of use-of-force
policies. See, e.g., Consent Decree at 23–27, United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. 00-11769 GAF (RCX)), available at
http://www.cacd.uscourts.gov (follow “search site” hyperlink; search “0011769”; follow the hyperlink for the first result); see also ROBERT C. DAVIS ET
AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, TURNING NECESSITY INTO VIRTUE: PITTSBURGH’S
EXPERIENCE WITH A FEDERAL CONSENT DECREE 7–8 (2002), http://www.vera
.org/publication_pdf/180_326.pdf.
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private employers.111 Historically, these cases have been
brought by both public and private enforcement authorities.112
Despite their effectiveness, systemic and class litigation in
civil rights cases have declined in recent years. Reports kept by
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts show a
decline in civil rights class action filings. From July 1983
through June 1984, civil rights class actions constituted a sizeable amount of the class action suits filed in federal court.113
From October 2003 through September 2004, this number was
down to 11.2%.114 The total number of civil rights class actions
went down, from 369 from July 1983 through June 1984 to 241
in 2004 (despite the passage of the ADA in 1991).115 As discussed above, these numbers can be partially explained by the
reduced ability of the private attorney general to bring and
prosecute these kinds of systemic, broad cases.116 Public enforcement officials have not picked up the slack. From July
1978 through June 1979, the United States filed 8 civil rights
class actions; from July 1983 through June 1984, it filed 1, and
from October 2003 through September 2004, it filed 5.117

111. See, e.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel, 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir.
1971) (ordering an employer to desegregate job assignments); EEOC v. Int’l
Union of Elevator Constructors Local 5, 398 F. Supp. 1237, 1264–65 (E.D. Pa.
1975) (ordering an employer to develop training programs for minority employees); see also Schwarzchild, supra note 103, at 890 (“Title VII litigation is
an excellent example of ‘public law’ or ‘structural’ litigation.”).
112. For an example of cases brought by public authorities, see supra notes
110–11 and accompanying text. For a classic and fascinating narrative of a litigation campaign waged by the NAACP, see generally GREENBERG, supra note
27.
113. See 1984 DIR. ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 486–88 tbl.X-5 [hereinafter 1984 ANN. REP.].
114. See 2004 DIR. ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. tbl.X-5 [hereinafter
2004 ANN. REP.], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/appendices/
x5.pdf. The trends are similar within the subcategory of employment discrimination law. While 1174 employment class actions were filed in federal court
from July 1975 through June 1976, the number was only 73 in 2002. Hart, supra note 17, at 820.
115. See supra notes 113 & 114.
116. John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1019–21 (1991) (attributing virtual disappearance of class action employment litigation to
changes in legal rules, particularly the Court’s decisions in East Texas Freight
System and Falcon); Garth et al., supra note 19, at 371 (noting that the economic incentive of attorney fees does not serve a sufficient incentive for lawyers to bring civil rights class action cases); see supra Part I.B.2.
117. See 1979 DIR. ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 674 tbl.X-5; 1984 ANN.
REP., supra note 113; 2004 ANN. REP., supra note 114.
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A. LACK OF ADA STRUCTURAL LITIGATION
These general trends are exacerbated in the ADA context.
There has been a notable lack of systemic and class action litigation under the ADA, particularly with regard to the law’s
employment provisions.118 Very recently, there have been several large class action lawsuits brought by private lawyers alleging discrimination on the basis of sex,119 but none relating to
disability.120
There are several executive branch agencies charged with
public enforcement of the ADA.121 I will focus my discussion on
the EEOC and Department of Justice (DOJ), which have the
most robust statutory role for public enforcement.122 Generally
speaking, these agencies have not made structural litigation a
high priority. The EEOC has acknowledged as much, noting its
failure to bring and develop broad, systemic cases (while recognizing that they could serve the public interest better by doing
a better job).123 Commentators have confirmed that the EEOC
has generally shied away from bringing large systematic cases,
both in the ADA and larger civil rights contexts.124 The DOJ’s
118. See Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 Duke L.J. 1, 19 (1996) (“Few of the
cases brought under the ADA are class actions . . . .”); Stein & Waterstone, supra note 15, at 890–94 (arguing that there is a lack of class action litigation
under the ADA).
119. See, e.g., Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 474 F.3d 1214, 1233 (9th Cir. 2007)
(certifying a large class of female workers bringing Title VII claims).
120. While Wal-Mart, like other large defendants, has been sued for disability discrimination by private lawyers, these cases have typically not been
brought as class actions. See Wal-Mart Watch, Issues: Discrimination, http://
walmartwatch.com/issues/discrimination (last visited Nov. 5, 2007) (presenting information on only smaller, individual discrimination suits).
121. These include the EEOC (Title I), the DOJ (Title II), the Department
of Transportation (Titles II and III), the Department of Agriculture (Title II),
the Department of Education (Title II), the Department of Health and Human
Services (Title II), the Department of Housing and Urban Development (Title
II), the Department of the Interior (Title II), the Department of Labor (Title
II), and the United States Access Board (Titles II and III). Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
122. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12113, 12117(a), 12188 (2000).
123. See LESLIE E. SILVERMAN ET AL., EEOC, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY,
SYSTEMIC TASK FORCE REPORT 1 (2006), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/
abouteeoc/task_reports/systemic.pdf (“[W]e found that EEOC does not consistently and proactively identify systemic discrimination. Instead, the agency
typically focuses on individual allegations raised in charges.”).
124. See Selmi, EEOC, supra note 73, at 16 (“Consistent with the EEOC’s
history and current litigation trends, a relatively small percentage of the cases
were filed as class allegations—forty-seven of the cases which constituted
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enforcement efforts have also come under criticism for being
“overly cautious, reactive, and lacking any coherent and unifying national strategy.”125
Aside from improving compliance, large-scale litigation efforts can also serve an important law development function.
For example, in the early years of Title VII, the Civil Rights
Division of the DOJ concentrated on establishing that Title VII
prohibited not only purposeful discrimination but also practices
with a discriminatory impact.126 The DOJ was a plaintiff in
four cases that made it to the court of appeals level, and established early precedent that neutral practices with a disparate
impact violated Title VII.127 This line of cases was a key part of
the road to the Supreme Court’s decision in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.,128 which “held that facially neutral ‘practices, procedures, or tests’ that are discriminatory in effect cannot be used
to preserve the ‘status quo’ of employment discrimination.”129
In contrast, despite the fact that the EEOC promulgated regulations explicitly stating that disparate impact is covered under

13.5% of the claims.”); see also Moss et al., supra note 73, at 18 (discussing
Professor Selmi’s data and conclusions). In the ADA failure to hire context discussed infra, only four briefs reflecting EEOC participation as a plaintiff demonstrated representation of more than an individual applicant. See EEOC,
Commission Appellate and Amicus Briefs (Sept. 6, 2007), http://www.eeoc.gov/
litigation/appbriefs.html (providing a search mechanism for EEOC positions
that “discuss significant legal issues which could affect the manner in which
employment laws are interpreted”).
125. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, PROMISES TO KEEP: A DECADE OF
FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 2 (2000)
(examining the enforcement of the ADA between 1990 and 1999 by using statistical and other federal agency data). Regarding Title II of the ADA, the report also argues that the DOJ has not taken sufficiently strong positions in
important litigation. Id. at 4–6; see also infra notes 137, 231–35 and accompanying text (noting the limited use of the DOJ’s power to bring ADA cases in
the public interest).
126. David L. Rose, Twenty-Five Years Later: Where Do We Stand on Equal
Employment Opportunity Law Enforcement?, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1121, 1139
(1989).
127. See Local 189 United Papermakers and Paperworkers v. United
States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Sheet Metal Workers
Int’l Ass’n, Local No. 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v. Hayes
Int’l Corp., 415 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1969); Local 53, Int’l Ass’n of Heat & Frost
Insulators v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969). But see Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 353–54 (1977) (“[A]n otherwise neutral,
legitimate seniority system does not become unlawful under Title VII simply
because it may perpetuate pre-Act discrimination”).
128. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
129. Rose, supra note 126, at 1140–41 (citing Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430).
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Title I of the ADA,130 neither the EEOC nor the DOJ have taken steps to develop the case law in this area.131
This underwhelming public enforcement at the federal level has been paralleled at the state level. Outside of a few selected states, federal protection is as strong as or stronger than
what is provided by state law.132 And while one commentator
has urged a move to the state law battlefield to enforce disability rights,133 there are few examples of state public enforcement
officials bringing systemic cases under state or federal law.134
Because this is an area where federal protection has, at least
on paper, been out in front of state law, and because many
state courts have looked to the ADA for guidance on interpreting state law,135 it is important for federal enforcement officials
to take the lead in litigating ADA cases.

130. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(c) (2007) (providing a potential defense to the
charge of disparate impact).
131. On the lack of ADA disparate impact litigation, see Stein & Waterstone, supra note 15, at 889–90.
132. See Alex Long, State Anti-Discrimination Law as a Model for Amending the Americans with Disabilities Act, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 597, 601–02 (2004);
see also Sande L. Buhai, In the Meantime: State Protection of Disability Civil
Rights, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1065 app. (2004) (listing state disability antidiscrimination laws). Some states, like California and Minnesota, offer more generous definitions of disability than have been interpreted under federal law.
Long, supra, at 629–30; see also CAL. GOV ’T CODE § 12926.1(a) (West 2005);
see also MINN. STAT. § 363A.03(12) (2006).
133. Buhai, supra note 132, at 1066.
134. There are exceptions. Then New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer
negotiated consent decrees with Priceline.com and the Ramada Franchise Systems, asserting that their respective websites were inaccessible to the blind
and visually impaired in violation of state and federal law. See Assurance of
Discontinuance, In re Ramada Franchise Systems, Inc. (Att’y Gen. of the State
of N.Y., Aug. 12, 2004), available at http://www.icdri.org/News/Ramada%
20AOD; Assurance of Discontinuance, In re Priceline.com (Att’y Gen. of the
State of N.Y. Apr. 8, 2004), available at http://www.icdri.org/News/
Priceline%20AOD. Similarly, the Massachusetts Attorney General recently
brought a complaint under state law against a bus company for refusing carriage to a blind couple because the husband used a guide dog. This case resulted in over $60,000 in damages and injunctive relief. Commonwealth v.
Fung Wah Bus Transp., Inc., No. 05-BPA-00758, 2007 WL 2068081, at *1–2
(Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination July 9, 2007).
135. See, e.g., Grant v. May Dep’t Stores, 786 A.2d 580, 583–84 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (“We have considered [federal] decisions construing the ADA as persuasive in our decisions construing comparable sections of [the District of Columbia Human Rights Act].”); Garcia v. Allen, 28 S.W.3d 587, 598 (Tex. App. 2000)
(using Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999), as persuasive when interpreting the Texas statute’s definition of disability).
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B. A MORE STRUCTURAL LITIGATION ROLE FOR PUBLIC
ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES
There are both legislative and regulatory bases for a
stronger structural litigation role for ADA public enforcement
authorities. The EEOC and DOJ are both authorized to bring
ADA lawsuits that are in the public interest. The EEOC, responsible for enforcing Title I against private employers, has
the ability to bring suit as a plaintiff, and its claims are not limited to the complaints made by a charging party.136 Similarly,
the DOJ is authorized to bring cases involving a “pattern or
practice” of discrimination by public employers under Title I,137
although it appears it has only done so once.138 The DOJ’s enforcement powers under Title II in cases involving public employers are the same as they are in the Title I context.139 Under
Title III, the DOJ can bring lawsuits if it has reasonable cause
to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in a
pattern or practice of discrimination, or in any other case that
raises an issue of general public importance.140
Apart from being allowed to play a structural role, public
enforcement authorities are uniquely suited to fill the structural enforcement gap. Most of the limitations that apply to private attorneys general do not apply to public enforcement authorities. These strengths of public enforcement authorities vis-

136. EEOC v. Caterpillar, Inc., 409 F.3d 831, 833 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[A] suit
by the EEOC is not confined ‘to claims typified by those of the charging party.’” (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 331
(1980))); see also EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 291 (2002)
(“[O]nce a charge is filed . . . the EEOC is in command of the process.”).
137. The DOJ’s role under Title I of the ADA (as well as that of the EEOC)
is determined by various provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including
the 1991 amendments set forth in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12117 (2000). These provisions provide that the EEOC should refer employment cases involving governments, governmental agencies, or political subdivisions to the Attorney General. Id. § 2000e-5(f ). The Attorney General is further authorized to bring civil actions whenever there is “reasonable cause to
believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice
of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights secured by” the ADA. Id.
§ 2000e-6(a).
138. See Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1124 (10th Cir. 1999) (alleging
disability discrimination by the Denver police department).
139. See 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (2000) (stating that enforcement of Title II is
the same as 29 U.S.C. § 794a, the Rehabilitation Act); 29 U.S.C. § 794a (2000)
(providing that enforcement provisions are the same as those found in the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(1)(B) (2000).
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à-vis the private attorney general help to assess when public
officials should devote resources to systemic litigation.
First, by not being tied to attorneys’ fees and a case’s ability to pay for itself, public enforcement authorities can truly
bring and prosecute cases in the public interest. Therefore,
whereas private attorneys general increasingly can no longer
afford to bring large class action civil rights cases,141 public enforcement authorities can. Systemic litigation is expensive, and
few private lawyers can match the government’s resources
when it decides to use them in a particular direction.142
Freedom from attorneys’ fees and damages as a means of
financing litigation also allows public enforcement officials to
bring cases for injunctive relief, which has traditionally been
the structural remedy of choice.143 Professor Selmi has recently
criticized privately brought employment discrimination class
action lawsuits as being too focused on obtaining large settlements, which primarily enriched the plaintiffs’ lawyers.144
Lawsuits brought by public enforcement authorities that focus
on institutional injunctive relief as opposed to damage awards
could help revive the public nature of these types of civil rights
class actions.145
141. Davies, supra note 93, at 238 (“In the civil rights class action context,
for example, there is higher demand than supply of attorneys because the attorneys can only afford to litigate cases that are virtually guaranteed to win.”);
see also Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 19, at 41–42 (“Buckhannon reduces
litigation not by promoting settlement, but by discouraging plaintiffs from
bringing meritorious but expensive claims in the first place . . . .”); Davies, supra note 93, at 258 (noting private civil rights class actions have gone down
because of financial factors).
142. The extent to which these agencies are funded or defunded is essentially a political decision. See supra notes 78–81.
143. Fiss, supra note 106, at 2 (“The structural suit is one in which a judge,
confronting a state bureaucracy over values of constitutional dimension, undertakes to restructure the organization to eliminate a threat to those values
posed by the present institutional arrangements. The injunction is the means
by which these reconstructive directives are transmitted.”); see also David Rudenstine, Institutional Injunctions, 4 CARDOZO L. REV. 611, 616 (1983) (noting
the importance of institutional injunctions and arguing that they are not in
conflict with federalism and democratic process values); Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions over Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison Court Orders,
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 561–64 (2006) (detailing the transformative effect of
injunctions in prisons).
144. See Selmi, supra note 14, at 1280.
145. Within civil rights law generally and disability law in particular, these
suits do happen. They are often brought by public interest organizations. For
example, in Barden v. City of Sacramento, 292 F.3d 1073, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002),
Disability Rights Advocates, a prominent nonprofit law firm dedicated to
bringing high profile ADA cases, sued the city of Sacramento for inaccessible
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Second, class action structural litigation has been curtailed
by the Supreme Court’s decision in General Telephone Co. of the
Southwest v. Falcon, which held that named class representatives had to demonstrate a greater unanimity of interest with
the proposed class.146 This tightened Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23’s reins for class certification: plaintiffs who suffered discrimination in hiring, for example, cannot represent
plaintiffs who were discriminated against in promotion decisions.147 This decision, combined with the 1991 amendments to
the Civil Rights Act that allowed Title VII plaintiffs increased
damages and jury trials, has led courts to view employment
cases as less amenable to class treatment.148 This restricts private litigants, however, far more than the government, particularly in disability cases.
Under the ADA, both the EEOC and DOJ have far more
procedural breathing room to pursue class-type relief than prisidewalks. The requested relief was a structural injunction requiring the City
to formulate a plan for sidewalk accessibility. Id. But these cases are the exception, not the norm. Public interest organizations do not have adequate staff
or funds to bring all of these cases, and government officials have not taken
the lead in doing so. See Bagenstos, supra note 61, at 35. The most prominent
disability-based public interest organizations are in large cities. Large segments of the country have no similar operations. In Mississippi, for example,
the largest disability rights organization has no lawyers. Mississippi Coalition
for Citizens with Disabilities, http://www.mscoalition.com/ (follow “Staff and
Board” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 5, 2007). Additionally, Mississippi’s Protection and Advocacy Office has only one staff attorney and does not typically
litigate. Mississippi Protection and Advocacy System, http://www.mspas.com/
staff.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2007).
146. 457 U.S. 147, 158 (1982).
147. Griffin v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1476, 1493–94 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding
that a class could not be certified when one representative complained promotion practices were discriminatory and others alleged the qualification exam
was discriminatory); see also Wagner v. Taylor, 836 F.2d 578, 595–96 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (holding supervisors are not in the same class as nonsupervisors
because they may have conflicting interests); Roby v. St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co.,
775 F.2d 959, 962–63 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that employees could not
represent a class of individuals affected by the railroad’s promotion policies or
those who were discharged for violating company rules because the employees’
complaint did not derive from either of these circumstances).
148. See Hart, supra note 17, at 820 (“In the years after the Court emphasized the importance of adherence to the requirements of Rule 23, the number
of class action suits filed in federal court decreased significantly.”); see also
Scotty Shively, Resurgence of the Class Action Lawsuit in Employment Discrimination Cases: New Obstacles Presented by the 1991 Amendments to the
Civil Rights Act, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 925, 935 (2001) (indicating
that Falcon ended widespread certification of across-the-board class actions in
discrimination lawsuits “because [i]t was no longer sufficient for one plaintiff,
represented by one law firm, to allege across-the-board discrimination”).

464

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[92:434

vate litigants. In General Telephone Co., the Supreme Court
held that the EEOC could seek class-wide relief for sex discrimination under Title VII without certification as a class representative under Rule 23.149 The same is true under the ADA,150
which has allowed the EEOC, in the few class-type cases it has
brought, to escape thorny class issues of individualized inquiries that courts usually view as necessary to determine disability.151 Similarly, when the DOJ brings “pattern or practice”
suits under Title I of the ADA, the government, when establishing its prima facie case, is not required to show individual discrimination with respect to each person for whom it seeks relief.152
Third, the ability of private litigants to sue state governments has been dramatically curtailed by the Court’s recent
“new federalism” jurisprudence. The ADA has been at the center of the development of this body of law. In Board of Trustees
of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, the Court held that,
under the principle of state sovereign immunity, individuals
may not sue the state for damages under Title I of the ADA.153
Insofar as the ADA is concerned, the Court has retreated from
this principle somewhat in Tennessee v. Lane154 and Goodman
v. Georgia,155 where it held that individuals may sue state enti149. 446 U.S. 318, 319, 326, 330 (1980) (“When the EEOC acts, albeit at
the behest of and for the benefit of specific individuals, it acts also to vindicate
the public interest in preventing employment discrimination. . . . Forcing
EEOC civil actions into Rule 23 model would in many cases distort the Rule as
it is commonly interpreted . . . . Rule 23(a) imposes the prerequisites of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. When considered in the light of these requirements, it is clear that the Rule was not designed to apply to EEOC actions brought in its own name for the enforcement
of federal law.”).
150. See, e.g., EEOC v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 935, 937
(D. Minn. 2002) (“The EEOC may properly bring the current ADA class action
lawsuit notwithstanding the Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 class requirements.”).
151. Id. at 938 (holding that the status of the EEOC as a plaintiff obviates
the argument for an individualized inquiry attack on class certification). For
an alternative view as to how courts should conceive of group identity through
the lens of pandisability, see Stein & Waterstone, supra note 15, at 905–16.
152. United States v. City and County of Denver, 943 F. Supp. 1304, 1309
(D. Colo. 1996) (“In seeking to protect the public’s interest, it is sufficient that
the government show specific evidence of company discrimination regarding
some of the employees that it seeks to represent, and that a broad-based policy
of employment discrimination existed.” (quoting Coe v. Yellow Freight Sys.,
646 F.2d 444, 449 n.1 (10th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted))).
153. 531 U.S. 356, 374 n.9 (2001).
154. 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
155. 546 U.S. 151, 151, 157–60 (2006).

2007]

PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT

465

ties for damages under Title II where they are seeking to vindicate fundamental rights. It is still uncertain how far this exception will extend. Under Garrett, individuals may sue state officials for prospective injunctive relief under Ex parte Young,156
but the limitation on damage remedies further undercuts the
financial ability of private lawyers to bring these kinds of cases.
In the ADA context this is significant, because state governments are a major provider of programs, services, and activities
to people with disabilities.157 Again, however, these discouraging restrictions do not apply to the government, which can
bring cases for damages regardless of new federalism sovereign
immunity rules.158
If the government possesses an array of systemic advantages to the private attorney general in bringing structural cases, how should it use this power? Public enforcement officials
should focus on bringing cases where the profit motive for
plaintiffs and private attorneys is low (either because of the
lack of damage remedy or limitations on attorneys’ fees recovery), noncompliance appears to be systemic, case law is undeveloped, and individual plaintiffs will have standing difficulties
challenging various forms of discrimination. I now turn to discussing specific ways, in the context of disability litigation, that
the government should take an active role in bringing structural litigation.
1. Employment-Hiring Cases
Before the enactment of the ADA, people with disabilities
existed only at the fringes of the labor market.159 The ADA
156. 209 U.S. 123, 154 (1908) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment does
not protect state officials from suit if the suit would enjoin the official from enforcing an unconstitutional statute); see also Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d
1019, 1025–26 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the plaintiffs’ ADA Title II claims
for prospective injunctive relief fell within the Ex parte Young exception to
state sovereign immunity).
157. According to a 2005 study, 32% (63 out of 197) of Title II cases brought
before the courts of appeals involved state actors as defendants. See Waterstone, supra note 61, at 1861–62.
158. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9.
159. According to the federal government’s National Health Information
Survey, when disability was defined as an impairment that imposes limitations on any life activity the employment rate for working-age people with disabilities was 49% in 1990. See H. STEPHEN KAYE, IMPROVED EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 9 fig.1 (2003), available at
http://sdc.ucsf.edu/pub_listing.php?pub_type=report; see also Walter Y. Oi,
Employment and Benefits for People with Diverse Disabilities, in DISABILITY,
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hoped to address this disparity and, by working to eliminate
employment discrimination, increase the number of people with
disabilities in the workplace. Unfortunately, its success in
doing so has been limited.160
To be sure, the Supreme Court’s definition of disability has
dramatically limited the number of potential employees that
can invoke the statute’s protections.161 But there are still
groups of people that consistently qualify as meeting the definition of disability.162 Regarding these groups, one reason that
the reach of the ADA’s employment law provisions have been
limited is the infrequency with which they are used to open
employment opportunities at the hiring stage. Even before the
ADA was passed, researchers began to chart the changing nature of employment discrimination litigation, noting that antidiscrimination laws protecting women and minorities were
used predominantly to protect the existing positions of incumbent workers.163 This trend is even stronger under the ADA,
where failure-to-hire cases are dramatically outnumbered by
discharge or accommodation for existing employee cases.164
It is in one sense understandable that there are not more
hiring cases. Legal prohibitions against hiring discrimination

WORK AND CASH BENEFITS 103, 121 (Jerry L. Mashaw et al. eds., 1996) (showing that the percentage of people with disabilities with jobs in 1986 was 33%).
160. See THE DECLINE IN EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES: A
POLICY PUZZLE 1–2 (Richard V. Burkhauser & David C. Stapleton eds., 2003)
[hereinafter DECLINE IN EMPLOYMENT]; see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Has the
Americans with Disabilities Act Reduced Employment for People with Disabilities?, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 527, 528–30 (2004) (reviewing DECLINE
IN EMPLOYMENT, supra).
161. See Amy L. Allbright, Special Feature: 2003 Employment Decisions
Under the ADA Title I—Survey Update, 28 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L.
REP. 319, 320 (2004) (“A clear majority of the employer wins in this survey
were due to employee’s failure to show that they had a protected disability.”).
162. Individuals who are blind or wheelchair users make up 4% of EEOC
charges. See ADA Charge Data by Impairments/Basis—Merit Factor Resolutions, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-merit.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2007).
163. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 116, at 1015–17.
164. See Steven L. Willborn, The Nonevolution of Enforcement Under the
ADA: Discharge Cases and the Hiring Problem, in EMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY,
AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: ISSUES IN LAW, PUBLIC POLICY,
AND RESEARCH 103, 103–04 (Peter David Blanck ed., 2000) (“[O]ver the short
life of the ADA, the ratio of discharge to hiring cases has been about 10 to 1, a
ratio that is substantially higher than for Title VII cases . . . .”). This was also
the case for employment cases under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See
Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 118, at 33–34.
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are inherently difficult to enforce.165 It is hard for applicants to
detect discrimination and to prove they are capable of performing the job for which they applied.166 Potential plaintiffs have
less incentive to pursue a lawsuit than existing employees,167
and are less likely to find a lawyer even if they are so inclined.168 Disability is seen as individualized and incapable of
aggregation, meaning that how an employer views one class of
persons with disabilities may not lead them to fail to hire
another type, which has exacerbated this trend.169 Yet this
leaves a void of enforcement, because this is exactly where employers have the greatest incentives to discriminate.170
This void is troubling, and needs to be filled in order to
realize the ADA’s goal of increasing the number of people with
disabilities in the workforce.171 What would a structural approach to litigating hiring discrimination look like? Broadly
speaking, there are two scenarios. In the first, a formal policy
keeps some category of people with disabilities out of the workforce. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. was such a case.172 Plaintiffs, twin sisters with myopia, claimed that defendant’s policy
requiring uncorrected vision acuity of 20/100 or better discri165. See Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223,
275 (2000) (“[I]t is generally quite difficult for disadvantaged workers to establish that they were unlawfully refused employment by an employer.”).
166. See Richard V. Burkhauser & David C. Stapleton, A Review of the
Evidence and Its Implications for Policy Change, in DECLINE IN EMPLOYMENT,
supra note 160, at 396.
167. Id. (noting how disappointed applicants decline to pursue litigation for
reasons such as a “less[er] chance of success, a desire to focus their energy on
searching for other jobs, fear of creating a negative reputation for themselves,
[and] lack of support from fellow employees or employee organizations”); see
also Willborn, supra note 164, at 115 n.2.
168. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 116, at 1003–09 (noting that
employees with more means have an easier time securing representation than
those with lesser means).
169. See Bagenstos, supra note 160, at 538. For an alternative approach
suggesting courts should take a broader view of disability discrimination, see
Stein & Waterstone, supra note 15, at 916–22.
170. Employers have at least two disincentives to hiring people with disabilities: first, it increases firing costs because of potential lawsuits, and
second, employers need to provide accommodations at their own expense for
disabled employees. See Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences
of Employment Protection? The Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
109 J. POL. ECON. 915, 924 (2001); Jolls, supra note 165, at 273–76.
171. See Bagenstos, supra note 160, at 555–56 (arguing that one hope for
increasing the effectiveness of Title I of the ADA is strengthening enforcement
of the antidiscrimination and accommodation requirements at the hiring
stage).
172. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
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minated against them.173 Assuming plaintiffs meet the definition of disability,174 cases like this turn on whether the requirement is job related and consistent with business necessity,175 whether the requirement protects the health or safety of
that worker or other workers from a direct threat,176 or whether a reasonable accommodation that will enable the applicant
to meet the standard is possible.177 These types of cases are an
analogue to an earlier wave of Title VII litigation: what has
been described as easier-to-identify “blanket prohibitions from
good jobs.”178 Whether pursued under a disparate treatment or
disparate impact theory, commentators generally view Title VII
as removing the most egregious examples of these types of restrictions.179 It is less obvious that this has been the case in
ADA litigation.180
The second type of failure-to-hire case is more complicated.
Here, there may be no formal (or at least apparent) policy that
excludes people with disabilities. Hiring decisions can be made
on the basis of even subconscious biases or discomfort with
bringing a previously excluded and stigmatized group into the
workforce.181 In both the Title VII and ADA contexts, this discrimination has proven harder to tackle,182 although, at least in
173. Id.
174. In Sutton, the Court held that the plaintiffs did not meet the definition of disability. Id. at 488–89.
175. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (2000).
176. Id. § 12113(b); see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73,
86–87 (2002) (holding that an employer can refuse to hire an individual with a
disability whom the employer reasonably believes is a threat to himself ).
177. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(B).
178. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 116, at 1015.
179. Id.; see also Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics:
Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 91, 137 (2003) (“[D]isparate impact theory has proven an invaluable tool for reducing employer reliance on job requirements that are unrelated
to job performance but that stand in the way of minority progress. Without
such a tool, employers would have been free to adopt facially neutral job requirements that maintained the exclusion of blacks and minorities from vast
areas of employment.”).
180. See Stein & Waterstone, supra note 15, at 861–62 (arguing that even a
basic application of disparate impact litigation involving neutral formal policies has been lacking under the ADA).
181. According to Professor Susan Sturm, unconscious biases are part of a
“second-generation” of discrimination. See Susan Sturm, Second Generation
Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458,
460 (2001).
182. See Bagenstos, Structural Turn, supra note 14, at 3–4 (averring that
disparate treatment and impact models of discrimination are ill-suited to redi-

2007]

PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT

469

regards to the ADA, I have previously argued that this is not
inevitable.183
Public enforcement authorities are the institutional actors
that are best suited to bring both categories of these failure-tohire cases. Both types present greater challenges for private attorneys general to challenge because they are resourceintensive, have lower probability of high damage awards, and
plaintiffs themselves are less likely to want to pursue them.
These disincentives, however, apply far less to public enforcement authorities. Both the DOJ and EEOC can pursue cases on
their own behalf in the public interest without finding a plaintiff who is ready and able to participate in long, difficult litigation,184 and have information-gathering mechanisms in place to
identify problematic patterns and trends in the employer community.185 Government lawyers are also not beholden to the
same financial incentives as the private bar. For these reasons,
they are in a better position to negotiate detailed injunctive relief creating forward-looking change in employment-hiring
practices.186 The goal is to use court oversight via injunctions to
create and enforce changes in the way employers perceive and
react to putative employees with disabilities.
stribute power and remedy unintentional discrimination); Michael Selmi, Was
the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 738–67 (2006)
(arguing that disparate impact theory has only proven useful in a limited universe of testing cases).
183. See Stein & Waterstone, supra note 15, at 902–22 (arguing that a new
construction of group identity and an increased use of disparate impact theory
could more readily attack structural barriers). For more optimistic views of
Title VII’s ability to attack “structural” discrimination, see Charles A. Sullivan, Re-Reviving Disparate Impact, 54–67 (Seton Hall Pub. L. Res. Paper No.
9, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=581503.
184. See, e.g., EEOC v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 935, 937–
38 (D. Minn. 2002) (holding that when the EEOC brings a case in its own
name pursuant to statutory authority, it may bypass the requirement of class
certification under Rule 23, thereby obviating the need for individual inquiry).
185. Before filing an ADA (or Title VII) employment case, an individual
needs to file a charge with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2000). The
EEOC then classifies and investigates the case. See Moss et al., supra note 73,
at 4 (detailing EEOC investigation procedures for ADA claims). Employers
with over one hundred employees are also required to file an “EEO-1” form
each year with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c); 29 C.F.R. § 1602.7–
1602.14 (2007). These reports contain information on enforcement, selfassessment by employers, and research.
186. See Michael J. Yelnosky, Filling an Enforcement Void: Using Testers
to Uncover and Remedy Discrimination in Hiring for Lower-Skilled, EntryLevel Jobs, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 403, 469 (1993) (“[T]he EEOC is more
likely than a private party to obtain injunctive relief.”).
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Regarding the first category of cases involving formal barriers, there are some limited examples of public enforcement
authorities bringing these kinds of cases. In EEOC v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., the EEOC argued that Northwest Airlines’s
blanket policy barring anti-seizure medicated epileptics and insulin-dependent diabetics from holding cleaner or equipment
service employee positions violated the ADA.187 Although a private litigant may have had trouble establishing class status,
the EEOC did not.188 Similarly, in EEOC v. United Parcel Services, Inc., the EEOC challenged a policy excluding monocular
drivers without regard to their actual safety records and driving abilities.189 And in EEOC v. SPS Temporaries, Inc.,190 the
Commission challenged a temporary employment agency’s hiring practices regarding applicants with disabilities. But these
cases are the exception, not the rule, in the limited pool of government litigation dealing with employer hiring.191
Public enforcement authorities have no visible strategy for
or history of bringing failure-to-hire cases that involve less
formal policies. Although difficult, these cases need to be part
of an effective employment enforcement scheme, as subtle bias,
stigma, and views of people with disabilities as inauthentic
workers run deep.192 Case development in this area necessitates a robust view of disparate impact law193 and pushes the
boundaries of tethering an employment decision to a “specific
187. 216 F. Supp. 2d 935, 935 (D. Minn. 2002).
188. Id. at 938.
189. 149 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1121–22 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
190. EEOC v. SPS Temporaries, Inc., No. 04-CV-0052 E(SC) (W.D.N.Y.
filed Jan. 27, 2004). This case was brought in the Western District of New
York, and was resolved in November of 2005. See EEOC, PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FY 2006 (2006), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/
abouteeoc/plan/par/2006/results_objective1.html.
191. There are more cases that have been brought on behalf of existing
employees. For example, see United States v. City and County of Denver, 943
F. Supp. 1304 (D. Colo. 1996), where the DOJ brought a pattern and practice
suit against the city and county regarding nonaccommodation of Denver police
officers. See also Press Release, EEOC, Denny’s Sued by EEOC for Disability
Bias Against Class of Workers Nationwide (Sept. 28, 2006) (covering an EEOC
nation-wide suit brought on behalf of Denny’s workers for nonaccommodation
and termination).
192. See Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA
Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 604–08 (2004)
(describing how people with disabilities are viewed as “inauthentic workers”).
193. See Stein & Waterstone, supra note 15, at 910–15 (discussing how an
older iteration of disparate impact law could attack systemic barriers in the
workplace).
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employment practice,”194 a theory for which there is limited
success under Title VII.195 The troublesome statutory provision
governing the proof structure of Title VII disparate impact,
however, does not technically apply to the ADA.196 Moreover,
unlike Title VII, the EEOC is uniquely positioned to provide
leadership under the ADA because it is responsible for promulgating regulations under Title I.197 The regulations that the
EEOC has promulgated support the ADA’s inclusion of disparate impact regime,198 yet the EEOC has not pushed this position in failure-to-hire cases.199
One way to develop failure-to-hire cases involving informal
policies would involve testing. Testing has been a valuable tool
in other areas of antidiscrimination law in helping to ferret out
difficult-to-detect discrimination.200 Primarily used by public
interest groups, testing has been used under the Fair Housing
Act and Title VII.201 In the employment context, testers are
194. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)–(B) (2000). The burden of proof required
by statute demands an identification of a specific practice. See id.
195. Most commentators and courts, however, seem settled that intangible
factors have trouble translating into a particular employment practice. See
Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 623, 657
(2005) (“[C]ourts have held that an employer’s ‘passive reliance’ on relational
means of exclusion is not subject to disparate impact attack.” (quoting EEOC
v. Chi. Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 292, 298 (7th Cir. 1991))). There are
examples of cases that are more receptive to these claims. In DeClue v. Central
Illinois Light Co., 223 F.3d 434, 435 (7th Cir. 2000), the plaintiff challenged an
employer’s failure to provide restroom facilities. Although the court failed to
find that this constituted sexual harassment, it did suggest that “insofar as
absence of restroom facilities deters women . . . but not men from seeking or
holding a particular type of job . . . the absence may violate Title VII” under an
impact theory. Id. at 436.
196. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)–(B) (regulating discrimination on the
basis of basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).
197. Id. § 12116.
198. Unlike the statute, which uses language consistent with disparate impact but does not mention the term, the EEOC regulations expressly reference
disparate impact. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(c) (2007).
199. This is in contrast to the DOJ’s aggressive disparate impact law development in the early years of Title VII. See Rose, supra note 126, at 1155–
57.
200. See Selmi, Public vs. Private, supra note 73, at 1426 (“[T]esting has
proved to be an effective means of documenting discrimination.”); Yelnosky,
supra note 186, at 413 (“Testing can help to root out discriminatory practices
where the disincentives to bring a private suit result in underenforcement.”).
201. See Stephen E. Haydon, Comment, A Measure of Our Progress: Testing
for Race Discrimination in Public Accommodations, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1207,
1216–17 (1997) (detailing the successes of testing under the Fair Housing Act);
see also Yelsnosky, supra note 186, at 413 (“The use of testers can uncover
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persons who apply for employment with the sole purpose of detecting whether discriminatory hiring practices exist, but who
do not intend to accept an offer of employment. The testers are
matched to appear equally qualified for the job with respect to
important hiring factors, including employment history and
references.202
Public enforcement authorities have used and supported
testing in limited fashion. Under the Fair Housing Act, the
government has developed a testing program that measures levels of housing discrimination and properly allocates enforcement efforts,203 although the bulk of the government’s testing
efforts involve various programs to provide financing to local
private fair housing groups.204 Under Title VII, the EEOC has
recognized the value of testing,205 and its current position is
that it will accept charges from testers.206 The EEOC has not
formulated its own testing program or engaged in systematic
efforts to promote testing programs of private groups, and there
is a split of agreement as to whether it is statutorily entitled to
do so.207 Although the issue has not yet come up, the EEOC
should have greater authority to create a testing program under the ADA because of the agency’s rule-making authority under the statute.208
employment discrimination that otherwise is unproveable because of its subtle
form.”).
202. Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Issues New Guidance on Legal Standing
of Testers (May 24, 1996), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/5-24-96a
.html.
203. MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV.,
HOUSING DISCRIMINATION STUDY 14 tbl.3.3 (1991) (showing that testing data
collected by HUD from fair housing organizations discloses that black testers
were falsely told that units were not available 17% of the time, and received
less favorable treatment than white testers 39% of the time).
204. Selmi, Public vs. Private, supra note 73, at 1426.
205. See Press Release, EEOC, supra note 202 (“Testing, which was recognized as a viable technique to uncover workplace bias more than 25 years ago,
has been utilized in various quarters including public accommodations, housing, and employment.”).
206. EEOC Notice No. 915.002, Enforcement Guidance: Whether “Testers”
Can File Charges and Litigate Claims of Employment Discrimination (May 22,
1996), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/testers.html.
207. See Yelsnosky, supra note 186, at 459–63 (arguing that while testing
is desirable, the EEOC presently lacks statutory authority to conduct testing);
see also Leroy D. Clark, Employment Discrimination Testing: Theories of
Standing and a Reply to Professor Yelnosky, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 37–46
(1994) (arguing that employment testing is presently within the power of the
EEOC).
208. 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2000).
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A testing program in disability cases would be a valuable
tool in the public enforcement arsenal, both as an effective innovation in its own right and as a supplement to cases that private lawyers are limited in their ability to bring.209 Although
certain to be controversial, public testing avoids one of the most
contested issues within testing law: whether private testers
have individual standing to sue for various forms of relief.210
For disability cases, testing would involve two applicants, one
with an obvious physical disability and one without, but similarly situated in terms of job qualifications. This would raise
two sets of issues, both of which would be valuable to assess potential litigation. First, are applicants receiving accommodations in the job application process?211 Second, and more importantly (or at least harder to detect), are bias and stigma
limiting opportunities for qualified applicants with disabilities?
Most knowledgeable observers believe they are. The 2004
National Organization on Disability/Harris Survey of Americans with Disabilities found that, as in previous years, the most
prevalent form of discrimination against people with disabilities in employment is not being offered a job for which one is
qualified.212 The second most common is being refused a job interview on the basis of a disability.213 The State Bar of California’s Committee on Legal Professionals with Disabilities reported that nearly half of the respondents it surveyed believed
that they were denied employment opportunities because of
their disabilities.214 More anecdotally, in May 2006, the American Bar Association Commission on Mental and Physical Disability convened the first National Conference on the Employ209. See Yelnsoky, supra note 186, at 429–55 (noting the obstacles private
individuals and groups face in testing on their own).
210. See generally Michael E. Rosman, Standing Alone: Standing Under
the Fair Housing Act, 60 MO. L. REV. 547 (1995) (discussing the inconsistent
fair housing standing decisions by the lower courts).
211. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4)–(7) (2000) (requiring reasonable accommodation in the job application process).
212. See NAT ’L ORG. ON DISABILITY, 2004 N.O.D./HARRIS SURVEY OF
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 31, 39 (2004).
213. Together, these two variants of discrimination account for 51% of jobrelated discrimination against people with disabilities. Id. at 39.
214. ABA COMM ’N ON MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY, THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF LAWYERS WITH DISABILITIES: A REPORT
FROM THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION FOR THE LEGAL PROFESSION 10–11
(2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/disability/docs/conf_report_final.
pdf. Many respondents also believed that they were denied jobs even though
they graduated in the top ten to twenty percent of their law school classes at
higher ranked schools than those that received job offers. Id. at 11.
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ment of Lawyers with Disabilities.215 This meeting and subsequent report documented the existence of negative stereotypes
about lawyers with disabilities in the legal profession. Many
accounts were presented about qualified lawyers with disabilities who were clearly precluded from legal opportunities when
interviewers realized they had disabilities.216 A testing program is invaluable to detect and craft a litigation response to
these types of violations.
2. Physical Access Cases for Privately Owned Places of Public
Accommodation
The ADA is unique amongst antidiscrimination statutes in
that it seeks to restructure the actual physical environment of
places of public accommodation. Although previous antidiscrimination laws like Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 required nondiscrimination in access to public places, the
changes required to the physical environment were limited.
With disabilities, however, discrimination appears to have been
built into the environment. Steps can be just as effective in
keeping someone with a wheelchair out of a building as a discriminatory policy is for a racial minority. To create access in
privately owned places of public accommodation, Title III of the
ADA requires that newly constructed or renovated facilities
must be fully accessible,217 and that structures that were built
before the ADA’s enactment must be made accessible where
doing so is “readily achievable.”218 The requirements are similar for public buildings under Title II.219
215. See id. In the interests of full disclosure, I am a Commissioner of the
ABA Commission on Mental and Physical Disability Law.
216. See id.; see also Ellen Simon, Job Hunt a Challenge for Disabled: Employers Wary Despite Applicants’ Qualifications, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, Apr. 10, 2006, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/
business/266073_disabilities10.html.
217. 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a) (2000).
218. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv).
219. The regulations interpreting Title II of the ADA provide that regarding existing facilities, “each service, program, or activity [conducted by a public entity] . . . when viewed in its entirety, [must be] readily accessible to and
useable by individuals with disabilities.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a) (2007). This
does not mean that each existing facility must be physically accessible to and
useable by individuals with disabilities. See id. § 35.105(a)(1). The section of
the regulations dealing with new or modified facilities provides that “[e]ach
facility or part of a facility constructed by, on behalf of, or for the use of a public entity shall be designed and constructed in such manner that the facility or
part of the facility is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . .” See id. § 35.151(a).
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Although there are no long-term systemic studies to date,
media reports, testimony from advocates across the country,
and other accounts have shown that widespread inaccessibility
of physical structures in private and public facilities remains a
rampant problem, even in cases where barrier removal would
not be difficult.220 Especially regarding privately owned places
of public accommodation, this represents a failure of the ADA’s
remedial scheme and reliance on private enforcement. Individual litigants can only receive injunctive relief under Title III,
and their lawyers’ only hope of receiving payment for these cases comes from recovering attorneys’ fees, an enterprise that has
become more uncertain after the Supreme Court’s decision in
Buckhannon.221 A recent essay by Professor Samuel Bagenstos
discusses the paradoxical situation created by a broad statute
with limited remedies.222 Professor Bagenstos notes the media
and political attack on serial litigation, which he characterizes
as an inevitable (though undesirable) consequence of importing
the private attorney general profit motive into civil rights litigation.223
There is an enforcement void here that the government is
best suited to fill. ADA access cases against privately owned
places of accommodations are inherently unattractive for the
private bar to bring. In addition to the lack of damage remedy
and difficulty obtaining attorneys fees, standing is difficult to
220. See Bagenstos, supra note 19, at 3; see also ADA Notification Act:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 49 (2000) (statement of Rick A. Shotz, ADA Consulting
Assocs.) (“[P]robably less than one building in 10 that is a public accommodation is compliant with the ADA.”). For an example of ADA compliance problems, see Dan Weikel, Getting There Is None of the Fun, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13,
2006, at B1 (discussing a lack of sidewalk and public right-of-way access in
Riverside, California).
221. 532 U.S. 598 (2001); see Albiston & Nielson, supra note 19, at 1089.
Regarding public buildings, the scenario under Title II is not much better.
Plaintiffs can only receive damages for cases involving “deliberate indifference.” Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001). A private plaintiff ’s ability to sue for damages is also curtailed by the Court’s decisions in Garrett and Lane. See Waterstone, supra note 64, at 795, 833–34.
222. See Bagenstos, supra note 19, at 3.
223. Id. at 25–30. On the additional backlash against ADA access suits, see
R. Scott Moxley, The New Crips; An Ex-Drug Dealer and Burglar Leads a
Wheelchair Posse Terrorizing Southern California Businesses. Would You Believe He Has the Law on His Side?, OC WEEKLY, Oct. 12, 2006. For additional
negative media portrayals of ADA litigation, see Linda Hamilton Krieger,
Foreword—Backlash Against the ADA: Interdisciplinary Perspectives and Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 9–11
(2000).
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establish. A plaintiff must meet the continuing violation doctrine, meaning that she must show that there is a risk of the
harm happening to her again.224 A plaintiff’s standing is also
tied to his or her disability, meaning that a wheelchair user
suing a stadium can only obtain an injunction with respect to
the parts of the stadium in which he encountered difficulty and
cannot seek relief for individuals with vision impairments.225
Again, the government can avoid most of these structural
limitations. Under Title III of the ADA, the government’s enforcement powers are substantially broader than private litigants. The attorney general can initiate complaints and commence a civil action if it believes that any person or group of
persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination, or
any person or group of persons has been discriminated against
and such discrimination raises an issue of general public importance.226 By suing in the public interest, the government’s
standing is not tied to any particular plaintiff or his or her disability.227 Unlike private individuals, the government can seek
compensatory damages,228 and can seek civil penalties (up to
$100,000 for multiple violations) in cases it deems important to
“vindicate the public interest.”229
Primarily, however, government enforcement can and
should get its power from its unique ability to pursue structural
injunctive relief. The attorney general can bring cases solely focused on invoking the courts’ injunctive powers to enforce and
monitor physical accessibility standards. Unlike private individuals, the government does not have to be overly concerned
about financing cases through attorneys’ fees and damage
224. Deck v. Am. Haw. Cruises, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1297 (D. Haw.
2000) (“[T]he plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a
legal protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) ‘actual
or imminent’, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’” (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992))).
225. Parr v. L&L Drive-Inn Rest., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1082–83 (D. Haw.
2000) (denying plaintiff ’s standing to sue for barriers that do not affect plaintiff ’s specific disability).
226. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(1)(B) (2000).
227. See Mary Crossley, Becoming Visible: The ADA’s Impact on Health
Care for Persons with Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 51, 63 (2000) (asserting that
actions brought by the DOJ or a United States Attorney are important because they “take the focus away from the harm threatened to a particular individual with a disability and can provide an effective mechanism for compelling a health care provider to conform its practices more broadly to the ADA’s
auxiliary aids requirements”).
228. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(2)(B).
229. Id. § 12188(b)(2)(C).
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awards. They can also bring broad cases challenging all facets
of inaccessibility in public places, rather than being tied to inefficient piecemeal litigation on behalf of individual or discrete
classes of plaintiffs.230
Yet across administrations, the attorney general’s office
has not pursued this agenda.231 Examining the Title III case
law for cases that the DOJ brought under their “general public
importance” and “pattern or practice” authority that involve
new construction232 shows that the DOJ’s cases have almost all
involved movie theater or sports stadium lines-of-access.233
While sparse in scope and number,234 these cases do show the
potential of this type of litigation strategy. In United States v.
AMC Entertainment, Inc., the DOJ secured a court order that
required compliance with ADA access codes in AMC stadiumstyle theaters across the country.235 The court kept jurisdiction
of the action for five years to enforce the injunction.236 What is
needed is more structural cases like this that create an indepth look at inaccessible conditions for broad categories of
people with disabilities.
These guidelines for when public enforcement officials
should devote resources to bringing structural litigation to supplement private enforcement—cases where the profit motive for
plaintiffs and private attorneys is low (because of a lack of
230. In a Title VII case in the pre-Falcon era, one court commented on this
principle. See McLendon v. M. David Lowe Pers. Servs., Inc., No. 75-H-1185,
1977 WL 15, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 1977) (“[T]his Court must reject the thesis that a named plaintiff must have been the victim of . . . discrimination . . .
manifested by an employer. To hold otherwise would be to burden the Courts
with a multiplicity of suits . . . . This would be plainly an inefficient method of
implementing . . . Title VII.”).
231. See Bagenstos, supra note 19, at 35; see also Milani, supra note 74, at
112–13.
232. 42 U.S.C. § 12183 (2000).
233. The fact that these cases have been consistently brought since the earlier years after the ADA’s passage demonstrates the Department’s path dependent behavior. See, e.g., United States v. Cinemark U.S.A., 348 F.3d 569,
572 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that the regulation requiring wheelchair accessibility for public assembly areas meant that theater owners must provide similar viewing angles for all patrons); United States v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc., 976 F.
Supp. 1262, 1268–69 (D. Minn. 1997) (holding an architectural firm in violation of the DOJ regulation involving sight lines for sports facilities).
234. For a reading, analysis, and codification of every Title III ADA case at
the court of appeals level from 1990–2004, see generally Waterstone, supra
note 61 (examining all eighty-two appellate cases brought under Title III).
235. United States v. AMC Entm’t, Inc., No. CV-99-01034-FMC(SHX), 2006
WL 224178, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan 10, 2006).
236. Id.
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damage remedy, limitations on attorneys’ fees recovery), noncompliance appears to be systemic, there is an absence of case
development, and individual plaintiffs will have standing difficulties challenging various forms of discrimination—certainly
also apply to other areas of disability law.237 In the broader universe of civil rights laws, there is also the potential for a structural approach by public enforcement officials to create meaningful change.238
237. One area of disability law involves the provisions of the Fair Housing
Amendments Act that require all new multifamily housing be designed and
constructed with six specified accessibility features. 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604(f )(3)(C) (2000). Professor Robert Schwemm notes widespread noncompliance with this statutory provision, and discusses the lack of cases despite
their potential for success. Robert G. Schwemm, Barriers to Accessible Housing: Enforcement Issues in ‘Design and Construction’ Cases Under the Fair
Housing Act, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 753, 768–74 (2006). The advantages the DOJ
receives from bringing these cases are significant. For example, in cases
brought by the Department, the courts have taken a relaxed view of the “continuing violation” doctrine. Id. at 845. Another area where this type of vigorous enforcement is at least as important is under the provisions of the Help
America Vote Act (HAVA) requiring that voting systems shall “be accessible
for individuals with disabilities, including nonvisual accessibility for the blind
and visually impaired, in a manner that provides the same opportunity for
access and participation (including privacy and independence) as for other
voters.” 42 U.S.C. § 15481(a)(3)(A) (Supp. III 2005). Here, public enforcement
is crucial, because the only grievance option available to private citizens is an
administrative proceeding. Id. U.S.C. § 15512. The DOJ has taken the position
that individuals do not have a private right of action to enforce this part of
HAVA. See Federal Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff ’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 3, Taylor v. Onorato, 428 F. Supp. 2d 384 (W.D. Pa. 2006)
(No. 06-481) (arguing that HAVA confers no private right of action); see also
Taylor v. Onorato, 428 F. Supp. 2d 384, 345 (W.D. Pa. 2006) (holding that private plaintiffs have no private right of action under HAVA access provisions).
The DOJ does have the ability under HAVA to bring “a civil action against any
State or jurisdiction in an appropriate United States District Court for such
declaratory and injunctive relief . . . as may be necessary.” 42 U.S.C. § 15511
(Supp. III 2005). So far, however, despite early evidence of noncompliance, the
Department has brought only two cases relating to the disability provisions of
HAVA. See United States v. Maine, No. 06-86-B-W, 2007 WL 1059565 (D. Me.
Apr. 4, 2007); Complaint, United States v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, No. 06CV-0263 (GLS) (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2006), available at www.usdoj.gov/crt/
voting/hava/ny_hava.htm.
238. Some of the nondisability provisions of the HAVA, for example, fit this
description, though the ability of a private plaintiff to bring a lawsuit challenging her ability to cast a provisional ballot is unclear, as the statute itself
provides no private right of action. See 42 U.S.C. § 15482 (Supp. III 2005)
(provisional ballot provision); cf. Sandusky County Democratic Party v.
Blackwell, 339 F. Supp. 2d 975, 975 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (holding that an individual has standing to sue under this provision pursuant to § 1983). Standing is
traditionally difficult to establish in voting cases, and HAVA’s provisional ballot provisions have been criticized for being unclear. See Rick L. Hasen, If It Is
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III. NEW GOVERNANCE
Litigation, or the threat of litigation, is a means to an
end—narrowing the gap between what laws formally state
should happen and what actually does happen. As set forth
above, public enforcement officials should engage in a structural litigation campaign to help increase ADA compliance. But
the reality is that enforcement agents—whether public or private—will never be able to bring every even potentially meritorious case. To a certain extent, an enforcement gap will probably always exist. For those that tend to take a litigation-centric
view of civil rights in general and enforcement in particular,239
there is a relatively new but expanding body of scholarship that
may ultimately challenge the assumption that litigation is the
enforcement apparatus of choice.240 Loosely referred to in the
literature as “new governance,” this scholarship moves away

Broke, Fix It. Now, RECORDER (S.F.), Nov. 4, 2004, available at http://www
.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1099217144168; Daniel Tokaji,
The 2008 Election: Could It Be a Repeat of 2000?, FINDLAW WRIT, Nov. 30,
2004, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20041130_tokaji.html. Similarly, victims of housing discrimination often may not realize they have been
treated unfairly, or even if so, may not want to sue, paralleling the problem of
victims of employment discrimination who have not been hired. Schwemm,
supra note 14, at 380. Development of disparate impact law has also been slow
and uneven. See James A. Kushner, An Unfinished Agenda: The Federal Fair
Housing Enforcement Effort, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 348, 356 (1988); see also
BROOKS ET AL., supra note 3, at 311 (noting that the Supreme Court has not
yet decided disparate impact case under the Fair Housing Act). A commitment
to public systemic litigation in these areas will help these statutes achieve
their respective goals of a fairer voting system and eliminate discrimination in
the housing market.
239. I include myself in this category. See Waterstone, supra note 61, at
1826–32 (looking at respective rates of litigation across the Titles of the ADA).
240. This coincides with an alternative strain of scholarship that urges a
move outside of the traditional legal process altogether to vindicate civil
rights. For example, Professors Kevin Johnson and Bill Hing have recently
written about a new immigrants’ civil rights struggle. See Bill Ong Hing &
Kevin R. Johnson, The Immigrant Rights Marches of 2006 and the Prospects
for a New Civil Rights Movement, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=951268. They suggest that with an
uncertain Congress and a judiciary unlikely to support social change, immigrant groups should focus their current efforts on building broad political coalitions with other groups. Id. (manuscript at 42–43, 47, 67–79). Professor Orly
Lobel also recently wrote on perceived limited successes of various civil rights
movements and the subsequent shift away from traditional legal reform toward community organizing and grassroots campaigning. Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extra-Legal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, 971–87 (2007). This is a view that Lobel
ultimately rejects. Id.
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from traditional modes of enforcement and regulation.241 Instead, it focuses on collaborative, multiparty, multilevel, adaptive, problem-solving methods of public policy implementation
that to varying extents supplement or supplant traditional regulation.
After briefly explaining the basics of new governance for
the uninitiated, this Part discusses a potential fit between disability policy as set forth in the ADA and enforcement options
that seek to shift the locus of control from courts to networks of
interested parties. Although with new governance the line between public and private actors becomes more blurry and less
important,242 I will focus primarily on the role public enforcement officials have to play in the constellation of new governance activities. In many ways, public officials have lagged behind private actors in the development of creative enforcement
mechanisms, despite many institutional advantages.243 Although the choice to focus on public enforcement is somewhat
limiting, I believe that it is defensible. As set forth above, pub241. Karkkainen, supra note 12, at 471–78 (explaining that “New Governance” is a new type of legal scholarship that is of growing importance); see
also Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004) (identifying, discussing, and linking governance scholarship); cf. Joel Handler et al.,
A Roundtable on New Legal Realism, Microanalysis of Institutions, and the
New Governance: Exploring Convergences and Differences, 2005 WIS. L. REV.
479, 492–98 (stating that new legal theory must develop to fulfill new social
demands and discussing the possible impact of the paradigm shift).
242. See Lobel, supra note 241, at 373 (describing the Renew Deal governance as engaging many actors while giving citizens active roles).
243. Innovation certainly occurs on the private side, even operating loosely
within the framework of traditional litigation. The law firm of Goldstein,
Demchak, Baller, Borgen & Dardarian, and solo practitioner Lainey Feingold,
have developed a method known as structured negotiations. They describe this
method as an alternative to litigation that emphasizes “collaboration, relationship-building, solution, and disability community empowerment.” See E-mail
from Lainey Feingold to ADRC Listserve (Jan. 3, 2007) (on file with author).
Structured negotiations aided in successfully negotiating legal agreements on
issues including Talking ATMs, accessible websites, tactile point of sale devices, and alternative format systems with various national companies. See The
International Center for Disability Resources on the Internet, News on Talking ATMs and Other News Dealing with Banks, Retail Locations, and Financial Institutions, http://www.icdri.org/AssistiveTechnology/ATMs/news_on_
talking_atms.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2007) (listing companies such as WalMart, Bank of America, RadioShack, Safeway, Citibank, and Wells Fargo); see
also Tim Hay, Negotiating Wins for the Disabled, DAILY JOURNAL (L.A.), June
21, 2007, at 3 (describing efforts of lawyers Lainey Feingold and Linda Dardarian to get corporations and local governments to improve accommodations for
the blind).

2007]

PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT

481

lic enforcement authorities have both the constitutional
mandate and statutory obligation to vindicate civil rights. They
should seek to do so in the most effective way possible, whether
this involves litigation or other, less conventional methods. Below, I will demonstrate that as a practical matter, public enforcement authorities are well suited as a matter of presence
and resources to play a strong role in new governance-type enforcement options.
Although this is a first step in applying new governance
theory to civil rights law (and not an exhaustive treatment on
the subject), I make some initial observations about its worth in
the disability arena. In particular, I highlight two areas covered by the ADA where public enforcement authorities could
actually take steps to decentralize ADA norm elaboration but
potentially improve compliance.244
A. FORM AND STRENGTH OF NEW GOVERNANCE
In the fields of labor law and environmental law, amongst
others, commentators have challenged the traditional modes of
enforcement and regulation, advocating a diversification of the
ways that enforcement officials interact with regulated entities.245 Sometimes (though not uniformly) referred to as new
governance,246 this body of work challenges the predominance
244. “Norm” is used here the same way Professor Susan Sturm uses it; that
is, moving from a general legal statement to a more specific one in which the
law is translated into concrete change. Sturm, supra note 181, at 522 (“The
structural approach to second generation problems calls for a dynamic and reciprocal relationship between judicially elaborated general legal norms and
workplace-generated problem-solving approaches, which in turn elaborate and
transform the understanding of the general norm.”).
245. See Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative
State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1997) (describing the promise of multistakeholder negotiation in the context of environmental law); James S. Liebman &
Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The Emerging
Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 183, 229–31, 271 (2003) (explaining a new activist movement within
school reform); Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV.
1227, 1231–32 (1995) (discussing an alternative method of environmental regulation). Without using the new governance label, Professor Susan Sturm applies many of the concepts associated with new governance theory to sex-based
employment discrimination. See Sturm, supra note 181, at 461–63 (addressing
increased participation by private actors, “internal problem-solving” within
the workplace, and greater tailoring of regulation). To date, however, these
principles have not been applied to disability law.
246. See Karkkainen, supra note 12, at 472 (using the term “New Governance”); Lobel, supra note 241, at 344 (using term “governance” while addressing the new governance model).
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of “traditional” regulation, whereby certain enumerated practices are directly prohibited and a centralized enforcement
agency implements and enforces the law, usually through adversarial litigation by that entity or by private actors.247 The
goal of new governance theory is to get a broad range of stakeholders involved, including regulated entities, private interest
groups, government enforcement agencies, and the class of
people that the law is intended to benefit. Ideally, these various
groups converge on a set of legal norms, and then utilize their
collective energy in achieving effective and context-specific solutions.
New governance advocates believe this approach has several strengths. Litigation is adversarial, and any process with
less focus on assigning blame is more likely to arrive at a mutually satisfying agreement. This can be particularly effective if
the range of stakeholders—the regulated entities, enforcement
officials, and the law’s beneficiaries—are all involved in discussing solutions.248 New governance’s premium on information
sharing allows reforms and compliance schemes that work well
for one actor to be passed on to other interested parties.249 In
this way, a broader audience is reached and impacted than
might be possible in litigation, and a continuous cycle of learning is created. Public enforcement officials, as well as private
actors, can facilitate this process.250 Finally, the norm elaboration and refinement that occurs by multiparty nonadversarial
talks can create behavior that pushes the bounds of what the
law might otherwise more formally require.251
247. In the literature, this is referred to as top down “hierarchy and control” regulation. See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 241, at 344 (stating that the new
governance model embodies greater participation and collaboration than the
New Deal’s hierarchical system).
248. WILLIAM A. SHUTKIN, THE LAND THAT COULD BE: ENVIRONMENTALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 14–15 (2000); see also
Lobel, supra note 241, at 374 (describing an increase in public and private sector interdependence).
249. See DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT:
HOW THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR
232–34 (1992) (examining strategic planning that involves studying a company’s current situation and goals, developing a way to achieve those goals, and
then measuring the result); see also Lobel, supra note 241, at 380–81 (stating
that the new governance model creates incentives to share information to enable the comparison of various success levels of methods in similar situations).
250. See Sturm, supra note 181, at 512–14 (information tracking by private
entities); see also Lobel, supra note 241, at 422–23 (information gathering by
public officials).
251. This is the thrust of Professor Sturm’s argument within employment
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Professor Orly Lobel’s recent work on workplace safety
regulation by the Occupational Safety Health Administration
(OSHA) illustrates new governance principles, with an emphasis on the role played by public enforcement officials.252 OSHA
is responsible for promulgating regulations for workplace safety
and for monitoring workplace compliance, primarily through
inspections. Yet OSHA has traditionally underenforced its regulations; and to the extent that OSHA enforced its regulations
through the traditional adversarial model, these efforts were
criticized for punishing good faith efforts to move beyond compliance, and for diminishing the willingness of regulated entities to cooperate and learn.253 This was partly symptomatic of
the fact that OSHA’s one-size-fits-all rules did not fit all firms,
especially in an era of fast production, small firms, and complex
chains of authority.254 Professor Lobel presents recent OSHA
initiatives as showing the potential successes of a new governance approach. These initiatives include incentives that offer
a decreased chance of inspection for firms that were below the
industry injury rate; OSHA partnerships with certain industries that allowed information sharing and steps to eliminate
specific risks; and an increased emphasis on training and outreach programs.255 The existing, although incomplete, evidence
reviewing these programs suggests that they have been successful. The Government Accounting Office concluded that the
new cooperative strategies have improved safety and health
practices, and allowed OSHA to play a “collaborative, rather
than a policing, role with employers.”256 Similarly, OSHA reports show a decrease in workplace injuries for firms particidiscrimination law; courts, workplaces, employees, lawyers, and mediating organizations can work together to tackle “second-generation” discrimination in
a way that courts have not under the operative legal framework of Title VII.
See generally Sturm, supra note 181, at 461–63, 567–68.
252. See Orly Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory and Industrial Relations: The
Governance of Workplace Safety, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1071, 1073 (2005) (“[Governance encompasses] a range of innovative policy approaches, integrates cooperation into the core of regulatory relations and sensibly combines both
choice and sanction . . . through a formalized structured legal framework.”).
253. Id. at 1088–90.
254. Id. at 1093–95.
255. Id. at 1104–08.
256. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH:
OSHA’S VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE STRATEGIES SHOW PROMISING RESULTS,
BUT SHOULD BE FULLY EVALUATED BEFORE THEY ARE EXPANDED 43 (2004),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04378.pdf; see also Lobel, supra
note 252, at 1108.
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pating in these programs,257 and interviews with participating
workplaces describe increased trust and better relationships
with OSHA officials.258
New governance is not without its downside. There is a
risk of co-option or exit, whereby the entities being regulated
either opt out of the scheme entirely or are able to so influence
the process that reforms become pretextual.259 Secondly, there
is the problem of voice, which involves making sure that the
beneficiaries of regulation sufficiently and meaningfully participate in the norms and rules that will impact them.260 Finally,
new governance’s reliance on soft law and actual track records
in creating reform have been questioned,261 although the great
weight of new governance scholarship recognizes the value of
traditional enforcement and regulation to complement “soft
law” approaches.262 Cognizant of these strengths and weaknesses, I now turn to explaining how new governance concepts
have been and could be effectively imported into disability law.
B. CONCEPTUAL FIT OF THE ADA WITH NEW GOVERNANCE
In thinking about new governance and disability law, one
is confronted with some initial choices. Some new governance
thinking involves social situations that occur at a different
point in time or space than the current state of disability law—
257. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP ’T OF LABOR, WORKPLACE
INJURIES AND ILLNESSES IN 2005 (2006).
258. Lobel, supra note 252, at 1109–10.
259. See Green, supra note 195, at 675 (2005) (describing co-option as a potential drawback of employer self-regulation); see also Lobel, supra note 252,
at 1075–76 (asking if the state will return as regulator if public-private partnerships are ineffective).
260. Lobel, supra note 252, at 1076.
261. See Karkkainen, supra note 12, at 476–77 (“[B]y all accounts[,] the actual transition of new governance approaches to public problem solving thus
far has been spotty. Innovations occur here and there, discernible within a
number of disparate policy domains but dominant in few, and the outcomes of
these scattered policy experiments remain ambiguous and contested. Even the
most successful experiments have yet to be replicated widely, leaving them
vulnerable to skeptics’ charge that their success depends upon factors unique
to their own time, place, and fortuitous circumstances.” (citations omitted));
see also Jacqueline Savitz, Compensating Citizens, in BEYOND BACKYARD
ENVIRONMENTALISM 65–69 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 2000) (criticizing the softness of new governance); Bagenstos, Structural Turn, supra note
14, at 27–34.
262. See Karkkainen, supra note 12, at 486 (“[M]ost New Governance scholars acknowledge the necessity for some or many forms of ‘hardness’ in law,
and would deviate from that, if at all, only by admitting ‘softness’ in one or a
few aspects of the legal regime they envision.”).
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for example, without a formal comprehensive statute.263 In this
Article, I do not attempt to speculate as to what a world without the ADA might look like in terms of disability policy and
regulation, although that would be an interesting thought exercise.
As a consequence of this choice, my primary focus will be
on governance options that, while working within the general
structure of the ADA, create opportunities to localize, decentralize, and increase the number of stakeholders who have a
say in how regulated entities comply with the law. This does
not diminish or eliminate the need for ADA litigation, although
ADA cases may lose their role as the primary procedural vehicle for establishing and vindicating positive rights. Rather, I
will highlight enforcement options that make the courts less of
a vehicle to define rights, and instead provide the enforcement
apparatus and backbone to more narrowly tailored and contextspecific solutions.264
The legal and policy frameworks of the ADA are amenable
to such an approach. From a textual perspective, the ADA essentially prohibits behavior by certain regulated entities that
“discriminates” on the basis of disability. This prohibition
comes in varying degrees of specificity, but there is enough interpretative and regulatory space to generate a fruitful discussion of nonlitigation enforcement alternatives.265 For example,
the ADA’s central command prevents discrimination on the ba-

263. See Lobel, supra note 242, at 436–38 (describing how new governance
principles underlie the legal rules for the internal Internet standard setting).
264. Other scholars use the litigation system to shift the locus of control
from courts more directly to stakeholders. Professors Charles Sabel and William Simon, for example, suggest that while structural litigation traditionally
focused on “command and control” type consent decrees, the movement is toward “decrees” that emphasize broad “goals and methods of monitoring
achievement.” Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights:
How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1025–26 (2004);
see also Green, supra note 195, at 678–83 (suggesting, alternatively, doctrinal
and administrative options going beyond legal rights to combat work culture
discrimination).
265. For example, to the extent that the ADA was merely a laundry list of
very specific physical modifications that certain classes of regulated parties
had to make, any discussion of how new governance might enforce—as opposed to create—those rules would be somewhat stilted. Either entities comply
or face lawsuits by private or public forces seeking to make them perform required statutory changes. Generally speaking, however, the ADA is not this
binary. See infra notes 266–72 and accompanying text.
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sis of disability.266 Within the statute, however, there is flexibility in executing this role. For example, even within employment law (which is one of the most detailed parts of the statute), an employer must reasonably accommodate a qualified
employee with a disability.267 How an employer internally
manages that process, however, is largely left up to that employer. To a significant extent, employers and employees must
discern for themselves what constitutes a “reasonable accommodation,” or invoke the power of the courts to decide the issue
for them.268 Similarly, while public entities must meet the program access standard, meaning that programs, services, and
activities must be accessible when viewed in their entirety,269 it
is largely up to the public entity to determine how to do so.270
Finally, under Title III of the ADA, all new construction must
conform to the United States Access Board’s ADA Accessibility
Guidelines.271 But these guidelines contain a provision allowing
departure from the technical requirements “where the alternative designs and technologies used will provide substantially
equivalent or greater access to and usability of the facility.”272
All of this creates the opportunity for more flexible, contextspecific solutions that can be arrived at through collaborative
266. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000) (“No covered entity shall discriminate
against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such
individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or
discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment.”); see also id. § 12132 (“Subject to
the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability
shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be
subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”); id. § 12182 (“No individual
shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns,
leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.”).
267. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
268. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2) (2007) (suggesting that “reasonable accommodation may include” altering facilities so that they may be used, changing job opportunities, and engaging the employee to determine his or her limitations). Even the employer’s “interactive process” engagement with the
employee is a creation of administrative regulation. Id.
269. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a) (2007).
270. Id. § 35.105 (requiring every public entity to complete a selfevaluation of their services, programs, and practices, and develop a transition
plan to make any necessary modifications).
271. See 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1) (2000); see also 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A, §
4.1.3 (2007) (“Accessible Buildings: New Construction”).
272. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A, § 2.2 (2007) (“Equivalent Facilitation”).
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problem solving, even within the context of traditional litigation.
There are additional reasons that disability law would be
supported by a move away from courts and lawsuits. In all of
its forms, litigation under antidiscrimination law is primarily a
search for blameworthy actors.273 Yet the ADA, perhaps to a
unique extent in antidiscrimination law, can be seen as incorporating a vision of distributive justice.274 In all of its titles, the
ADA assigns costs to public and private actors who may harbor
no animus toward people with disabilities. The cost of accommodating these individuals and creating access where before
there was none is statutorily designed to be borne by a broad
range of actors, including private employers, owners of privately owned places of public accommodation, or individual state
and local governments. Forms of regulation that focus less on
blame may be better suited to distributive goals than litigation.275
Finally, many of the criticisms of traditional “command
and control” top-down regulation apply to ADA enforcement. In
other fields, new governance scholars have criticized public
regulation as creating both over- and underregulation and enforcement.276 The problem of ADA underenforcement has been
discussed above: there is very little real risk of employers or
businesses being sued for violating the ADA, and even less of a
chance such a lawsuit would be brought by a public enforcement official.277 Yet there is also at least perceived overen273. See Julie Chi-Hye Suk, Antidiscrimination Law in the Administrative
State, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 405, 420–23 (stating that blameworthiness is included as an element in the Supreme Court’s finding of discrimination).
274. Id. at 426–27. Although Professor Suk only discusses reasonable accommodation under Title I of the ADA, the basic concept can and should be
applied to the ADA more globally. All three of the ADA’s titles move beyond
traditional conceptions of “equal treatment” and include reasonable accommodations requirements. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2007) (reasonable modification under Title II); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000) (reasonable
modification under Title III).
275. See Suk, supra note 273, at 473 (arguing that administrative regulation is better suited to distributive goals than litigation because it can be more
nuanced and is less focused on traditional concepts of blameworthiness of individual actors).
276. See Lobel, supra note 252, at 1086–92 (arguing that OSHA’s regulatory and enforcement causes practice under regulation and enforcement).
277. In 2006, for example, the EEOC received 15,575 disability charges.
See EEOC, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 (ADA) CHARGES FY
1997–FY 2006, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-charges.html (last visited Nov. 5,
2007). They litigated forty-two ADA cases in 2006. See EEOC, EEOC Litiga-
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forcement, evidenced by the business community’s complaints
about overly technical and difficult-to-understand architectural
requirements.278 New governance theorists also criticize the
traditional regulatory model as bogged down in ossified regulations and unresponsive to fast-moving market realities.279
Within disability law, Title I of the ADA has been criticized for
having limited success in attacking “second-generation” subconscious discrimination.280 Similarly, the job security that the
ADA is supposed to provide is of limited usefulness “in a world
of reduced job security for everyone.”281
C. PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS
This Section first highlights several existing public-level
programs that stress collaboration, information sharing, and
flexibility. The Section then offers some critiques from new governance theory. Finally this Section proposes and discusses two
somewhat more ambitious alternatives, both offered with an
eye toward increasing the range of actors involved in and effectiveness of norm generation: (1) expanding administrative programs under the DOJ; and (2) applying doctrinal approaches
from sexual harassment law to reasonable accommodation
claims.
There are already some facets of the disability law and policy system that stress collaboration, cooperative interactions,
tion Statistics, FY 1997–FY 2006, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/litigation.html
(last visited Nov. 5, 2007). This might not be quite as extreme as the case of
OSHA regulation. See OSHA Reform: AFL-CIO Delegates Urge Congress to Act
on Legislation to Amend Workplace Safety Law, 23 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 20,
at 527 (Oct. 13, 1993) (statement of John Sweeney) (“[I]n the 23 years [since]
the OSHA law was passed, only one employer has gone to jail for willfully violating OSHA law and killing a worker. In the last 10 years, seven people have
gone to jail for harassing wild burros on federal land.”). It does show, however,
that there is very little risk of an employer being sued for disability discrimination by the EEOC.
278. See Moxley, supra note 223, (criticizing a lawsuit for an improperly
mounted bathroom mirror); see also Marjie Lundstrom & Sam Stanton, Visionary Law’s Litigious Legacy, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 12, 2006, at A1 (criticizing lawsuits for colors and wording of signs).
279. See Lobel, supra note 241, at 405 tbl.2 (characterizing the traditional
regulatory model as “ossified,” with a “rigid and fixed” view of the nature of
law).
280. Travis, supra note 15, at 5–6; see also Sturm, supra note 181, at 468–
74.
281. Samuel R. Bagenstos, US Airways v. Barnett and the Limit of Disability Accommodation, in CIVIL RIGHTS STORIES (Myriam Gilles & Risa Goluboff
eds., forthcoming 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=953759.
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and information sharing. The various ADA regulations, for example, were written with input from the disability law and
business communities.282 This process ensures that an array of
stakeholders have a voice, if not an ultimate say, in regulations
that will impact them. Public agencies have also attempted to
distill the law’s requirements into various user-friendly guides.
The EEOC and DOJ all have helpful information on their websites that provides visitors with nonbinding suggestions for how
to comply with the ADA.283 The EEOC has also made an effort
to increase its outreach and training activities.284
The ADA also offers at least one concrete incentive for collaboration. The law provides that state and local governments
can have their building codes certified by the DOJ as meeting
or exceeding minimum accessibility guidelines.285 If they do,
such governments receive a rebuttable presumption of compliance in any ADA Title III litigation.286 This increases the opportunity for collaboration and effective ex ante compliance.
There have also been some efforts for public enforcement officials to serve as a clearinghouse for information. The EEOC

282. See Equal Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg.
35,726, 35,726 (July 26, 1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630) (noting that
2400 disability rights representative participated in the rulemaking process,
and that various employer groups, individuals, and disability rights representatives submitted 138 comments to the EEOC); Press Release, United
States Access Board, Access Board Issues New Guidelines for Accessible Design (July 23, 2004), available at http://www.access-board.gov/news/ada-aba
.htm (explaining that the participation of a “cross section of stakeholders, including representatives from disability groups, the design profession, and
building codes organizations” helped create a “historic level of harmonization”
during the review of the ADA regulations).
283. ADA Home Page, http://www.ada.gov/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2007);
EEOC, Disability Discrimination, http://www.eeoc.gov/types/ada.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2007). Among other subjects, the EEOC handbooks discuss how
attorneys, small businesses, and food service companies may provide reasonable accommodations for individuals with disabilities. See id. The DOJ’s handbooks cover topics ranging from achieving van-accessible parking to providing
disability accommodations in polling places. See ADA Home Page, supra.
284. See EEOC, Outreach, Education and Technical Assistance, http://www
.eeoc/gov/outreach/index.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2007) (detailing the EEOC’s
training and outreach efforts).
285. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2000).
286. See id. The DOJ reports that it has certified codes in Texas, Maine,
Florida, Maryland, and North Carolina, and has requests pending from California, Indiana, New Jersey, and Utah. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Additional Information on the Certification Process, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/certinfo
.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2007).
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has stated a commitment to create stakeholder networks,287 including advocacy groups and community organizations, although it is unclear how extensive or effective these efforts
have been. As part of his New Freedom initiative, President
George W. Bush issued an executive order directing federal
agencies to work with states to help them assess their compliance with the ADA.288 The result was DisabilityInfo.gov,
which bills itself as “the federal government’s one-stop Web site
for people with disabilities, their families, employers, veterans
and service members, and many others.”289 Through its Program to Monitor ADA Litigation, the DOJ has recently made
more of an effort to serve as a point of centralization for ADA
litigation.290
Perhaps the best example of a sustained and effective collaborative approach to ADA enforcement is the DOJ’s Project
Civic Access program under Title II.291 Under this program, the
DOJ identifies state and local governments and conducts compliance reviews. The DOJ has developed technical assistance
materials to help communities come into compliance with Title
II, and ultimately enters into settlement agreements to ensure
such compliance. As of September 2007, the DOJ has entered
into 155 settlement agreements with 144 localities in all 50
states.292 This program serves as a repository of information
gathering, and has allowed the DOJ to build a body of expertise
in identifying and offering solutions for common problems with
Title II compliance. Also, by negotiating with individual state
and local governments, the DOJ can impact more communities
than it could by using more expensive and time-consuming litigation. Further, the DOJ can tailor consent decrees that make
sense for individual communities. Nevertheless, cities and
towns are not lining up to participate; the state and local governments that participate in Project Civic Access are chosen by

287. See EEOC, PRIORITY CHARGE HANDLING TASK FORCE app. c (1998),
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/aoubeeoc/task_reports/pch-lit.html.
288. Exec. Order No. 13,217, 66 Fed. Reg. 33,155 (June 18, 2001).
289. Welcome to DisabilityInfo.gov, http://www.disability info.gov/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2007).
290. See United States Dep’t of Justice, Program to Monitor ADA Litigation, http://www.ada.gov/litmon.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2007).
291. See United States Dep’t of Justice, Project Civil Access Fact Sheet,
http://www.ada.gov/civicfac.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2007).
292. Id.
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the DOJ, and not the other way around.293 Moreover, the consent decrees negotiated under Project Civic Access do not go
beyond a bare minimum of statutory compliance.294 This is despite the fact that the program defines the ADA’s goals more
broadly than antidiscrimination, which seems to open the door
for a broader dialogue.295
Ultimately, these developments trend in the direction of
new governance without taking large steps. Two more aggressive approaches, both issue areas within the ADA, (1) offer little in the way of precise statutory guidance except for high level
guarantees of protection from discriminatory behavior; (2)
could benefit from individualized and contextualized solutions
that would be more accepted by stakeholders than those that
courts have been able to provide; (3) like many other areas of
the ADA, are currently underenforced; and (4) are places where
public enforcement authorities are uniquely positioned to provide leadership on nontraditional enforcement options.
The first alternative is Title II’s broad mandate that public
entities not discriminate on the basis of disability in the programs, services, and activities that they offer.296 This rather
sparse statutory provision offers a unique opportunity for new
governance principles to work. The law sets broad aspirations
at a fairly general level, but leaves room for norm elaboration
and defining.297 Yet the current system of underenforcement
293. See id. (“In most of these matters, the compliance reviews were undertaken on the Department’s own initiative under the authority of Title II and,
in many cases, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 because the governments receive financial assistance from the Department and are prohibited
by the Act from discriminating on the basis of disability.”).
294. They may even stop short of that. See id. (“During the investigations,
staff of the Disability Rights Section reviewed compliance with most ADA requirements.” (emphasis added)).
295. See id. (“The key goals of the ADA are to ensure that all people with
disabilities have equality of opportunity, economic self-sufficiency, full participation in American life, and independent living.”).
296. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000) (“Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination
by any such entity.”).
297. The statute provides that the Attorney General will promulgate regulations to “implement” Title II, see 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a) (2000), which the DOJ
has done, see 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.101–35.190 (2007). These regulations, while
somewhat more specific than the actual statute, still leave ample room for
specific norm generation. See, e.g., id. § 35.130(b)(1) (“[Public entities shall
not] deny a qualified individual with a disability the opportunity to participate
in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service.”).
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leaves too many states and counties free to essentially opt out
of any meaningful reform.298 Some steps are needed to jump
start reform and ensure accountability.
One option would be expanding the basic idea that is offered in the DOJ’s Project Civic Access program. The DOJ could
require public entities covered by Title II to submit selfevaluations and plans, demonstrating what modifications to accessibility they have already made and what they are planning
to make.299 Rather than focusing on selected cities, the DOJ
would essentially require public entities to more formally engage in the process. There is precedent for public enforcement
authorities playing this type of screening and informationgathering role. The EEOC, for example, collects disabilityrelated information from employers in its EEO-1 surveys.300
And the structure of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act involved
states having to “pre-clear” changes to their voting systems
with the DOJ.301
The challenge would be to find the proper balance between
using these reports to create opportunities for similar entities
to learn from each other’s decisions and progress, yet also still
vesting ultimate coercive power with the DOJ if the plans reveal deficiencies. These plans need to be public, so as to create
a centralized source of knowledge from which other public entities may learn. The value of this endeavor would be compromised if the risk of litigation was so great as to discourage hon298. See, e.g., Waterstone, supra note 61, at 1857–59 (describing how states
exhibit “significant noncompliance” with Title II of the ADA).
299. This idea would be easy to implement. Since 2003, the DOJ ’s Title II
regulations have required that public entities must complete self-evaluations
of their services, policies, and practices, and develop a transition plan to make
any necessary modifications. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.105a. Yet the opportunity for
this exercise to stimulate discussion, reform, and learning was largely lost.
Though the fact that these plans had to be publicly available for three years
after they were written, see id., there was no visible effort by the DOJ to use
these plans as a basis for information sharing and dialogue, despite the Department’s statutory mandate to “implement” Title II. See 42 U.S.C. § 12134
(2000).
300. The EEOC has been criticized for not systematically analyzing or
sharing that information. See supra note 185; see also Sturm, supra note 181,
at 551.
301. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1970). True, this part of the Voting Rights Act
has triggered contentious federalism objections. But what I am describing for
ADA purposes is far less intrusive on state sovereignty; whereas section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act requires states to actively petition the federal government before they make changes (to avoid incurring legal liability), state and
local governments merely have to report on what they have done and are
planning to do. See id.
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est reporting and good faith efforts at innovation. It would also
be harmful if, based on empty promises of future reform, derelict public entities were allowed complete amnesty when no
progress was being made. In striking this balance, the guideposts should be process as well as outcome oriented. In preparing these plans, are public entities involved in meaningful discussions with different constituencies, including seeking the
input of the disability community? Knowing that the ADA does
not require absolute and perfect access to every facet of every
governmental endeavor, have the parties made appropriate
choices about priorities and direction? Do all parties seem satisfied (or equally unsatisfied) with the outcome and plan?
This proposal attempts to shift the locus of control from
courts deciding what is or is not “discrimination,” an undertaking for which their capacity in the Title II context has been
rightly criticized as inconsistent and insufficiently flexible.302
Instead, the power is ideally put in the hands of stakeholders,
allowing them the space to create solutions that are meaningful
and acceptable to them. The DOJ—and the courts if necessary—serve as facilitators in this process and enforcers if need
be. However, like others who express trepidation at the “softness” in new governance,303 one would be loathe to abandon the
ultimate coercive authority of either the private or public attorney general. Without it, flexible enforcement options start to
look more like opt out provisions.304
The second area where new governance theory could have
a helpful impact on creating change involves reasonable accommodation claims. Here, the law provides a somewhat more
302. Compare Am. Ass’n of People with Disabilities v. Hood, 310 F. Supp.
2d 1226, 1236 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (holding that Florida Supervisor of Elections
violated the regulations promulgated under the ADA by purchasing a voting
system that was not readily accessible to people with disabilities without
third-party assistance), with Am. Ass’n of People with Disabilities v. Shelley,
324 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1126 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (“Nothing in the Americans with
Disabilities Act or its Regulations reflects an intention on the part of Congress
to require secret, independent voting.”).
303. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
304. Within campaign finance law, for example, commentators have acknowledged some successes of the Federal Election Commission’s attempts to
use new enforcement techniques, including conciliation, while noting that the
Commission has maintained the ability to litigate if need be. See Bradley A.
Smith & Stephen M. Hoersting, A Toothless Anaconda: Innovation, Impotence,
and Overenforcement at the Federal Election Commission, 1 ELECTION L.J.
145, 146–51 (2002); see also Todd Lochner, Overdeterrence, Underdeterrence,
and a (Half-Hearted) Call for a Scarlet Letter Approach to Campaign Finance
Violations, 2 ELECTION L.J. 23, 25–32 (2003).
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definitive backdrop. The ADA explicitly confers a positive right
on individuals with disabilities to a reasonable accommodation
to allow them to perform their jobs.305 But the ADA is silent on
what separates a reasonable accommodation from an unreasonable one.306 The doctrinal result is a rather inconsistent set
of cases where judges attempt to delineate an imprecise line,307
despite having a limited set of statutory and policy tools for
doing so.308 This uncertainty is further exacerbated by the fact
that most ADA cases do not even make it to the point where a
judge or jury will make a pronouncement as to a requested accommodation’s reasonableness; rather, most cases are dismissed at the earlier summary judgment phase, often because a
plaintiff cannot meet the statute’s definition of disability.309
This state of affairs provides insufficient guidance or norm
elaboration for the vast majority of accommodation request situations that never get anywhere near the courthouse.310 This is
an unsatisfying outcome, and one that fails to sufficiently tap
into the law’s transformative potential. How can the positive,
305. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(a) (2000) (defining discrimination as the
failure to make “reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
imitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability”).
306. See id. Congress specifically considered—and rejected—a more precise
formula. See Burgdorf, supra note 85, at 518. Although this has been criticized
as a weakness of the statute, see Steven B. Epstein, In Search of a Bright Line:
Determining When an Employer’s Financial Hardship Becomes “Undue” Under
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 390, 397 (1995), it allows
for this type of norm-shifting from courts to a range of stakeholders.
307. Compare Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, 487 F.3d 480, 484 (8th Cir. 2007)
(holding that an employee with a disability must be reassigned to a vacant position as an accommodation only if the employee is the most qualified applicant for that position), with Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1167
(10th Cir. 1999) (holding that reassignment under the ADA results in automatically awarding a position to a qualified disabled employee regardless of
whether other, better-qualified applicants are available).
308. See Jeffrey O. Cooper, Interpreting the Americans with Disabilities
Act: The Trials of Textualism and the Practical Limits of Practical Reason, 74
TUL. L. REV. 1207, 1217–24 (2000) (describing the limits of statutory interpretation in ADA cases).
309. Amy L. Allbright, 2005 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title
I—Survey Update, 30 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 492, 492 (showing that in 2005, in 288 out of 401 Title I cases, employers won on motions for
summary judgment or to dismiss due to plaintiff employee’s failure to meet
the requirements of a prima facie case of discrimination).
310. See Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized? An Empirical Analysis of Employment Discrimination Litigation as a Claiming System, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 663, 664–65 (arguing that antidiscrimination law is
“seldom used by people who perceive themselves to be the target of workplace
discrimination”).
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though imprecise guarantees in the ADA be more effectively
utilized?
Under contemporary notions of class action litigation, reasonable accommodation cases are often viewed as so individualized that litigating them on a systemic basis has not proven effective.311 One answer, then, may lie in borrowing from
doctrinal moves urged in sexual harassment law, and increasingly focusing on process in the reasonable accommodation
context.312 Liability could be imposed on employers who do not
have a fair and legitimate process for assessing the reasonableness of any requested accommodation. There is regulatory and
case law support for such an approach. The EEOC’s regulations
already come down strongly on the side of making the reasonable accommodation request an “interactive process,”313 and at
least one circuit court has held that an employer who does not
engage in the interactive process may be precluded from obtaining summary judgment on an ADA failure-to-accommodate
claim.314 If a court was called to do so, it could ultimately pass
judgment on the reasonableness of a requested accommodation,
but placing a doctrinal premium on the process could force employers to more seriously respond to requests for accommodation.
A more administrative-type proposal would involve employers submitting reports to the EEOC detailing their reasonable accommodation practices, including past responses to re311. See Stein & Waterstone, supra note 15, at 879–85 (explaining that
under group-based discrimination theories, disability-based employment suits
have proceeded on a largely individualized basis).
312. An employer may raise an internal antiharassment policy as a defense
to a sexual harassment claim. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S.
742, 765 (1998). Some circuits have expressed this as a presumption that an
employer has exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct sexual harassment. See, e.g., Matvia v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., Inc., 259 F.3d 261, 268 (4th
Cir. 2001). Finally, demonstration of good faith efforts to comply with Title VII
is a defense to punitive damages. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526,
545 (1999).
313. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2007) (explaining that the interactive process
should “identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations”).
314. See, e.g., Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1116 (9th Cir. 2000)
(en banc), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub. nom. U.S. Airways,
Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002). Justice Stevens specifically noted that the
Ninth Circuit “correctly held that there was a triable issue of fact precluding
the entry of summary judgment with respect to whether [an employer violates
the ADA] by failing to engage in an interactive process.” Barnett, 535 U.S. at
407 (2002) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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quests for accommodation and procedures for handling such requests. The template for this already exists; it would essentially be a more detailed version of the EEO-1 form that large employers are already required to file with the EEOC.315 Like the
Title II discussion above, there will be an issue regarding the
level of coerciveness of these reports. Should they be voluntary,
with perks (like a rebuttable presumption in the employer’s favor in litigation) offered to employers that demonstrate innovative internal processes for dealing with disability at the hiring
and reasonable accommodation stages (ideally arrived at with
consultations with specialists like the Job Accommodation
Network and/or disability community),316 or have a demonstrated and constituent record of hiring employees with disabilities? Or should they be mandatory, with penalties or risk of litigation for deficient practices?
In any event, the focus of both the doctrinal and administrative approaches attempts to use the shadow of litigation to
influence behavior outside of court in a way that stresses problem solving and bringing various stakeholders to the table. The
goal is to move reasonable accommodation cases away from
courts, where they tend to become zero-sum gain contests between adversaries, toward networks of employers, employees,
and specialists who have the incentives to arrive at mutually
agreeable ex ante solutions. In so doing, the hope would be that
the conversation could be transformed from litigating highly
individualized contentious cases toward efforts to create more
disability-friendly workplaces.317

315. See supra notes 185 & 300 and accompanying text.
316. The Job Accommodation Network is a free consulting service designed
to “increase the employability of people with disabilities by: 1) providing individualized worksite accommodations solutions, 2) providing technical assistance regarding the ADA and other disability related legislation, and 3) educating callers about self-employment options.” Job Accommodation Network,
http://www.jan.wvu.edu (last visited Nov. 5, 2007).
317. Because the number of actual employees who will even file a claim
with the EEOC, let alone bring a lawsuit, is so miniscule, the hope is that this
self evaluation will benefit far more employees than could ever be impacted
except through the mechanism of class and systemic litigation. See Nielsen &
Nelson, supra note 310, at 664–65. For alternative solutions, see Green, supra
note 195, at 679 (suggesting that individual claim for harassment could trigger
“diagnostic investigation into the possibility that a broader discriminatory
work culture” may exist); and Stein & Waterstone, supra note 15 (offering a
litigation-based system for transforming individualized claims for accommodation into larger workplace reevaluations).
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CONCLUSION
It is my hope that this Article will expand the dialogue on
the enforcement of civil rights and antidiscrimination laws.
Rights without remedies benefit no one, and laws that are systematically underenforced create a “hollow hope” that can impede other forms of social change. The existing discussion has
focused on the limits of the private attorney general to enforce
civil rights laws. The importance of private enforcement cannot
be disputed, and it is imperative that judicial opinions limiting
the ability of the private civil rights bar to sue acting in the
public interest are reversed. But until that happens, and even
thereafter, public enforcement should not be let off the hook so
easily. In the past, public enforcement played a more important
role in the enforcement of civil rights; and it is my hope that
this can happen in the future.
To that end, I have focused on what a more effective public
enforcement scheme should look like. Within the context of the
ADA, this will vary across contexts. The first and most important piece is a public commitment to systemic litigation. The
criteria for identifying areas where this should occur are where
the profit motive for plaintiffs and private attorneys is low,
noncompliance appears to be systemic, there is an absence of
case development, and individual plaintiffs will have standing
difficulties in challenging various forms of discrimination.
Within disability law, I have presented two categories of cases—failure-to-hire and physical access cases—that fit this description. Outside of disability law, there are certainly others.
New governance also provides a theoretical foundation for
evaluating other types of enforcement activity. Enforcement options that stress creative individualized solutions, collaborative
problem solving with a diverse range of stakeholders, and effective information strategies deserve support. There are areas
within the ADA that would benefit from more diverse yet localized norm elaboration. Ultimately, however, these more flexible alternatives need to be coupled with a consistent and clear
commitment to systemic public litigation. The two parts of this
paper should be understood as functioning together to improve
public enforcement. In this way, the ADA can take its place
amongst other civil rights statutes as having created opportunity and access for a previously excluded group.

